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ABSTRACT
Reports of state-sponsored harmful cyber intrusions
abound. The prevailing view among academics holds that if the
effects or consequences of such intrusions are sufficiently
damaging, international humanitarian law (IHL) should
generally govern them-and recourse to armed force may also be
justified against states responsible for these actions under the
jus ad bellum. This Article argues, however, that there are
serious problems and perils in relying on analogies with
physical armed force to extend these legal regimes to most events
in cyberspace. Armed conflict models applied to the use of
information as a weapon and a target are instead likely to
generate "legal phantoms" in cyberspace-that is, situations in
which numerous policy questions and domestic criminal issues
are often misinterpreted as legal problems governed by the IHL
framework or the jus ad bellum. This Article assesses this
dilemma in the context of four key problem areas relating to
dimensions of information: (1) problems of origin, organization,
and availability; (2) problems of access and control; (3)
problems of exploitation; and (4) problems of manipulation and
content.
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It has long been clear that private persons and state-sponsored
actors can cause damage by transmitting information through
cyberspace (to disrupt, exploit, manipulate, or deny access to data in
other computer systems and networks) and that such actions pose a
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real threat to businesses and governments.1 While cybercrime, state-
sponsored hostile cyber acts, and diverse types of cyber mischief are
common, the world has not yet experienced a "cyberwar."2 In spite of
dire, repeated predictions to the contrary, a cyberwar (an armed
conflict limited to cyber actions alone) may in fact be unlikely.3
Yet regardless of how conflict and competition in cyberspace may
be characterized, military organizations have concluded that
cyberspace is in fact a new contested "domain" for military operations
(joining the land, maritime, air, and space domains), and some have
announced their intention to achieve "superiority" in it. 4 This
willingness to apply a traditional model of military operations is
based on the assumption that conflict in cyberspace represents an
extension of conflict in physical domains, and therefore, actions taken
in this realm should generally be subject to the same rules and
approaches that apply to the employment of "kinetic capabilities."5
1. For example, cyber threats have reportedly forced the U.S. government to
spend vast sums on cyber defense and operations. See Barton Gellman & Greg Miller,
U.S. Spy Network's Successes, Failures and Objectives Detailed in 'Black Budget'
Summary, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2013, at Al (noting that leaked reports show how the
U.S. government now budgets several billion dollars a year on "conducting cyber
operations").
2. See JAMES ANDREW LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES, THE
CYBER WAR HAS NOT BEGUN 1 (2010), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/
100311 TheCyberWarHasNotBegun.pdf ("We are not in a 'cyber war'. War is the use of
military force to attack another nation and damage or destroy its capability and will to
resist. Cyber war would involve an effort by another nation or a politically motivated
group to use cyber attacks to attain political ends. No nation has launched a cyber
attack or cyber war against the United States.").
3. See Thomas Rid, What Would a Real Cyberwar Look Like?, NEW SCIENTIST
(Sept. 15, 2013), http://www.newscientist.comlarticle/mg21929334.800-why-a-cyberwar-
wont-happen.html#.Uqx02bQsrlI ("Never has a human been injured or hurt as an
immediate consequence of a cyberattack. Never did a state coerce another state by
cyberattack. Very rarely did state-sponsored offenders take credit for an attack. So if
we're talking about war - the real thing, not a metaphor, as in the 'war on drugs' -
then cyberwar has never happened in the past, is not taking place at present, and
seems unlikely in the future.").
4. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS AIR
FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 3-12, at 37 (amended Nov. 11, 2011) [hereinafter AIR
FORCE, CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS] ("[A] culture shift is underway that reflects the
reality that cyberspace is a contested domain and the importance of maintaining
cyberspace superiority.").
5. A U.S. DoD policy report noted that
[i]nternational legal norms, such as those found in the UN Charter and the law
of armed conflict, which apply to the physical domains (i.e., sea, air, land, and
space), also apply to the cyberspace domain.. . . If directed by the President,
DoD will conduct offensive cyber operations in a manner consistent with the
policy principles and legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic
capabilities, including the law of armed conflict. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Def., Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report: A Report
to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,
Section 934, at 5, 9 [hereinafter DoD Cyberspace Policy Report].
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The feared arrival of a new epoch of cyber warfare and the
decision by military organizations to treat cyberspace as a new
operational military domain have been accompanied by an eagerness
to view the law of armed conflict or the jus in bello (also referred to as
international humanitarian law or IHL) as the appropriate legal
framework to govern many cyber operations, particularly those
conducted in response to so-called cyber attacks.6
The decision to apply the IHL framework to events in cyberspace
may appear to be an easy one, drawing on the perceived similarity of
the effects of cyber operations and those of conventional military
operations in physical domains. For example, a former U.S. military
official has suggested that "a cyberattack is governed by basically the
same rules as any other kind of attack if the effects of it are
essentially the same." 7 It is thus not surprising that military
organizations have proceeded to equate many conventional and cyber
operations, concluding for example that "[t]he fundamental targeting
issues arising are no different in cyber operations as compared to
those applicable to kinetic targeting." 8
By viewing conflict in cyberspace as an extension of conflict in
physical domains and by emphasizing the apparent similar effects of
cyber and conventional weapons, the IHL framework becomes by
default the appropriate lens for assessing many hostile cyber .acts.
This Article argues, however, that due to the unusual properties of
information itself, there are serious problems and perils in relying on
such analogies to extend the IHL framework to most events in
cyberspace.
Rather than being easily governed by a broad application of the
IHL framework, the use of information as a weapon and a target will
more often be highly problematic. Armed conflict models are likely to
generate "legal phantoms" in cyberspace-that is, situations in which
numerous policy questions, domestic criminal issues, and
technological challenges are misinterpreted as legal problems
governed by the IHL framework or that implicate the jus ad bellum.
(This latter body of international law-which is prominently reflected
in obligations in the United Nations Charter-governs recourse to
6. . See David Sanger & Elisabeth Bumiller, Pentagon to Consider Cyberattacks
Acts of War, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2011, at A10 (citing General Kevin P. Chilton, the
head of U.S. Strategic Command, as saying that "in the event of a cyberattack 'the law
of armed conflict will apply"').
7. See S. Gorman & J. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL ST. J., May
31, 2011, at Al (quoting Charles Dunlap, a retired Air Force Major General).
8. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE OPERATIONS AND THE
LAW 99 (2d ed. 2009) (noting that, if an armed conflict is present, the "fundamental
targeting issues arising are no different in cyber operations as compared to those
applicable to kinetic targeting").
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armed force, as opposed to the IHL regime, which governs the way
warfare is conducted.)9
As examined in this Article, the clear reluctance by states to
apply these rules to cyber incidents, standing alone, is prudent. There
is an underappreciated and significant danger in broadly applying the
IHL framework to diverse areas of state-sponsored competition and
conflict.1 0 This is particularly true with respect to the application of
IHL principles and obligations, as well as the jus ad bellum, to the
many diverse uses and dimensions of information in cyberspace.
The IHL framework and the jus ad bellum nonetheless continue
to be advanced as appropriate legal frameworks to fill perceived gaps
in existing legal coverage of cyberspace, particularly in an
environment where even the U.S. secretary of defense warns of a
"cyber Pearl Harbor," in which catastrophic physical damages are
caused by a future cyber attack. 11 However, such hypothetical,
devastating, and stand-alone cyber attack scenarios remain highly
unlikely from several different perspectives. 12 The reality of the
current cyber threat is much different-it is informational in nature,
characterized by diverse and increasingly complex cyber actions
involving the disruption, exploitation, manipulation, or damage of
data.
Current state practice reflects this more complex reality, since no
state has actually invoked and applied IHL rules or the jus ad bellum
to any hostile cyber act standing alone (nor actually engaged in
cyberwar). In practice, cyberwar is in fact still a theoretical concept,
and states have thus not yet applied an effects-based approach to real
cyber incidents, nor have they done so based exclusively on analogies
9. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE 2 (1993) (describing the jus ad bellum as "the rules of international
law relating to the recourse to force" and "the norms that determine when the state
may permissibly resort to force against another state").
10. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and the
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, 89 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 719, 726
(2007) [hereinafter International Humanitarian Law] (noting that because of the more
flexible standards applicable to the lawful taking of life and the detention of persons in
armed conflicts, "it is both dangerous and unnecessary, in practical terms, to apply IHL
to situations that do not amount to war. This is not always fully appreciated.").
11. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of
Cyberattack on U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2012, at Al (warning that "the United States
was facing the possibility of a 'cyber-Pearl Harbor' and was increasingly vulnerable to
foreign computer hackers who could dismantle the nation's power grid, transportation
system, financial networks and government").
12. See, e.g., Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 35 J. STRATEGIC
STUD. 5, 10 (2012) ("If the use of force in war is violent, instrumental, and political,
then there is no cyber offense that meets all three criteria."); John Arquilla, Panetta's
Wrong About a Cyber 'Pearl Harbor': The Internet Doesn't Work that Way, FOREIGN
POL'Y (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/19/panettas.
wrong-about-a-cyber pearl harbor#sthash.xHDbOd4d.dpbs.
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drawn from the use of conventional weapons in the physical world.13
As examined in this Article, the more nuanced and reluctant
approach taken by states instead reflects both practical
considerations and serious legal concerns, the latter being integrally
linked to fundamental problems posed by information as a weapon
and target. Cyber operations must thus be contrasted with
conventional military operations, which involve weapons- employing
physical forces and objects, including (but not limited to) those
employing kinetic energy.14
While it is possible to characterize various types of information
as "cyber weapons" and various data sets (including those connected
to physical objects) as "targets," these uses of information raise many
issues that are much different than those presented by the use of
conventional weapons against physical targets. The wholesale
importation of the IHL framework and the jus ad bellum into the
world of cyber conflicts thus risks ignoring problematic and legally
significant dimensions of information.
This Article examines the impact of these dimensions of
information on the IHL framework and the jus ad bellum when they
are applied to conflicts and competition in cyberspace and contrasts
them with the application of IHL rules in conventional conflicts in
physical domains. These dimensions of information are assessed in
the context of four key problem areas as they relate to the use of
information as a weapon and target.
These problem areas, which are examined in Parts I through IV
of this Article, are (1) problems of origin, organization, and
availability; (2) problems of access and control; (3) problems of
exploitation (and related challenges to effects-based legal thresholds);
and (4) problems of manipulation (and related questions concerning
content and users). A careful assessment of these problem areas calls
into question the general application of the IHL framework and the
jus ad bellum to conflicts in cyberspace and also challenges
supporting theories that focus on effects-based analogies with
13. See Taking the Mystery Out of Cyberwar, WASH. POST (June 16, 2013),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-16/opinions/40013015_1_stuxnet-effects-
consequences ("Although the military has designated cyberspace as a new domain of
conflict, there hasn't been a real cyberwar yet. Much about this kind of conflict among
nations or groups is still only conjecture.").
14. While the terms kinetic and physical are sometimes incorrectly used
interchangeably, a more accurate definition of the term kinetic for targeting purposes
refers to "actions that involve the forces and energy of moving bodies, including
physical damage to or destruction of targets through use of bombs, missiles, bullets,
and similar projectiles." See UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, TARGETING AIR FORCE
DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-1.9, at 115 (2006). Nonkinetic weapons thus include a variety
of weapons such as those that emit directed electromagnetic energy or otherwise
"produce effects without direct use of the force or energy of moving objects." Id. at 116.
As discussed below, unlike cyber capabilities, such nonkinetic weapons employ physical
forces and display physical properties.
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conventional weapons in physical domains. The Article concludes
with further reflections on the inherent difficulties associated with
regulating information as a weapon, the problems in broadly
analogizing conventional armed conflicts with events in cyberspace,
and the critical importance of legal analysis for distinguishing the
physical from the informational.
I. INFORMATION AS A WEAPON: PROBLEMS OF ORIGIN,
ORGANIZATION, AND AVAILABILITY
A. The Legal Status of Cyber Capabilities as Potential Weapons
It is clear that information technologies and new types of
information have already had profound consequences for military
targeting capabilities on the modern battlefield. For example,
conventional weapon systems have benefitted in previously
unimaginable ways from guidance systems based on information
provided by global-positioning-system satellites. 15 Meanwhile,
military commanders have gained access to unprecedented
intelligence and surveillance capabilities and transformational real-
time data provided by unmanned aerial vehicles. 16
While the use of new types of information is responsible for
dramatic improvements in the targeting capabilities of many
conventional weapon systems, the use of information itself, as a cyber
weapon, is an evolving new chapter in the long history of warfare.
These changes include transformational attack capabilities for the
military forces of states as well as new asymmetrical attack
capabilities for nonstate actors.1 For the most advanced military
powers, cyber capabilities also create new possibilities for attacking a
wide variety of objects that may have previously been considered too
difficult to target with highly destructive conventional weapons.18
15. See P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 58 (2009) (noting both the key role that
GPS guidance systems played in the rise of "smart bombs" and the transformation
integration in the mid-1990s of unmanned systems with GPS technology-which a
retired U.S. Air Force officer described as "the magic moment" for these systems).
16. See Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT'L L.
409, 417 (2009) (noting the use by U.S. ground forces in Iraq of new, transformational,
real-time intelligence capabilities, "especially the full motion video provided by UAVs").
17. See William F. Lynn III, Defending a New Domain-The Pentagon's
Cyberstrategy, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 98-99 (2010) ("[C]yberwarfare is asymmetric.... A
dozen determined computer programmers can, if they find a vulnerability to exploit,
threaten the United States' global logistics network, steal its operational plans, blind
its intelligence capabilities, or hinder its ability to deliver weapons on target.").
18. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences from Knock-on Effects: A
Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INVL L. REV. 1145,
1166 (2003) (noting that "CNA capability provides an enlarged target list that allows
commanders to attack additional targets that they may believe are militarily necessary
but previously unreachable").
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Diverse types of computer viruses, worms, malware, logic bombs,
and other potentially destructive computer programs continue to be
developed from a wide spectrum of information resources.' 9 Such
harmful computer programs could arguably be classified as cyber
weapons even if a precise or comprehensive definition of that term
remains elusive. 20 Thus, notwithstanding definitional problems, the
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has reportedly assessed the
military utility of various cyber techniques and data packages in
order to determine how they should be classified alongside other U.S.
military capabilities. 21
A "weapon" for purposes of the IHL regime is broadly defined
under Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as "a
weapon, means or method of warfare."22 This expansive definition
ensures that the United States and other countries must seriously
consider the legal ramifications of the study, development,
acquisition, or adoption of possible cyber techniques, tools, and
capabilities that may have military applications. 23
Because it was not difficult to envision scenarios in which
various types of harmful computer programs or other data packages
could be directed against the computer systems and networks of an
enemy, scholars concluded at an early stage that such information
could constitute a means or method of warfare (or "arms" for military
forces to employ as part of an armed conflict) and thus could be
subject to the limitations of the IHL regime. 24
Beyond this widely stated proposition that the IHL framework
could be applicable to certain hostile cyber actions, the precise extent
19. See GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF INTERNET § 10.02
(3d ed. 2013) (noting that "[t]he scope of computer security threats continues to expand
and diversify" and that "[n]ew security threats continue to emerge"); DOD CYBERSPACE
POLICY REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 (noting that "[m]ost of the technology used in this
context [the development and use of malicious cyber tools] is inherently dual-use, and
even software might be minimally repurposed for malicious action").
20. For example, the DoD suggests that "there is currently no international
consensus regarding the definition of a 'cyber weapon."' Id.
21. See Ellen Nakashima, Defense Dept. Develops List of Cyber-Weapons,
WASH. POsT, June 1, 2011, at A3 (reporting that "[t]he Pentagon has developed a list of
cyber-weapons and tools, including viruses that can sabotage an adversary's critical
networks" and that this "classified list of capabilities ... has been approved by other
agencies, including the CIA").
22. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted June 8,
1977, art. 36, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 1].
23. The definition is not only broadly encompassing, but also forward-looking.
See KNUT DORMANN, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS RES. CTR., APPLICABILITY OF THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACKS 2 (2004), available at
http://www.icrc.org/englassets/files/other/applicabilityofihltocna.pdf (arguing that the
existence of the standard set forth in Protocol I "is a strong indicator that [its drafters]
anticipated the application of its rules to new developments of methods and means of
warfare").
24. Id.
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to which that framework should govern specific actions in cyberspace
is much less clear. There currently is no state practice and no
consensus regarding the actual application of IHL rules (or any other
international legal obligations) to cyber attacks. 25 Conversely,
however, it may be argued that there is a widespread and consistent
practice by states of not applying the IHL regime to events that
actually occur in cyberspace.
The unwillingness of states to apply IHL obligations to real
actions in cyberspace may also reflect practical and strategic
considerations that inhibit any discussion or public review of these
actions, since states tend to shroud both the development and the
deployment of their cyber capabilities in great secrecy. 26 States may
also be reluctant to expose their vulnerabilities by discussing hostile
cyber actions (and related damages), which were directed against
them.27
A further explanation for the absence of state practice in
applying IHL rules to cyberspace may relate, however, to a critical
legal factor: the inherent difficulties in applying the IHL regime to
information as a weapon and a target on the same basis that it is
applied in conventional conflicts to physical forces, objects, and
terrain. In this regard, assessing problems related to the origin,
organization, and availability of information serves as a good starting
point in illustrating the dimensions of information that complicate
such a broad application of the IHL framework and the jus ad bellum
to events in cyberspace.
1. Information: The Problem of Origin
Information, more so than physical objects and forces, may not
permit those who are harmed by it to identify its origin or source.
Computer specialists, engineers, scientists, and government experts
25. See Duncan B. Hollis, An E-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 377,
404-05 (2011) ("No state has ever formally admitted its complicity in a cyberattack or
cyberexploitation; nor is there any consensus on any state having done so in violation
of international law.").
26. See JEFFREY HUNKER, CREEPING FAILURE: How WE BROKE THE INTERNET
AND WHAT WE CAN Do To Fix IT 92 (2010) (noting how "cyberwarfare competition is
shrouded in secrecy, making it difficult to determine national vulnerabilities and
threats").
27. For example, while Iran admitted that its computers at a nuclear facility
had been infected by the so-called Stuxnet worm, it has at various times denied that
the malware damaged any of the facility's systems. See Glenn Kessler, Iran's Nuclear
Program Reportedly Struggling, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2010, 8:44 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/22/AR2010112206746.html
(noting that, despite evidence to the contrary, "Iran denies the worm caused any
problems"); see also Martin C. Libicki, Sub Rosa Cyber War, in THE VIRTUAL
BATTLEFIELD: PERSPECTIVES ON CYBER WARFARE 53, 58 (C. Czossek & Kenneth Geers
eds., 2009) (arguing that "[tihe overall motive - for both sides - for keeping matters out
of the press is that cyber warfare is a negative-sum game").
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continue to make well-funded efforts to develop better methods and
"forensics" for identifying the physical source and ultimate origin of
data packages used in hostile cyber actions. 28 In spite of these efforts,
the nature of the information-and the nature of the Internet-
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to identify the origin of
information used as a weapon and the intent motivating those
employing it.29
Because cyberspace is primarily a domain of information, it has
only limited physical connections and properties (unlike the domains
of land, sea, air, and space) and is characterized by many invisible
actions.30 Even if some malicious acts in cyberspace can be traced to
specific physical connections, the ultimate origin of the harmful
information may remain a mystery because of the nature of
information. One impediment is that information in harmful
computer programs can also be used to commandeer and remotely
control other computers or computer networks.31 These compromised
computers ("zombies") or compromised networks ("botnets") may then
direct or support a wide variety of malicious acts in cyberspace
without the knowledge or consent of the users.32
Using the methods described above, hackers, criminals, and
other actors routinely make use of hijacked systems and networks to
engage in unauthorized cyber activities while avoiding detection and
28. See, e.g., DOD CYBERSPACE POLIcY REPORT, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing
the DoD improvements in cyber forensics, including support for the Defense Cyber
Crime Center).
29. Herbert Lin noted that
[n]o one has come close to solving the problem of technical attribution - the
ability to identify the party responsible for an offensive cyber operation based
only on technical indicators and information associated with that
operation. . . . [I]n the worst case, it may be difficult or impossible even to know
when an offensive cyber operation has begun, who the attacker is, and what the
operation's purpose and effects are or were.
See Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J. NAT'L SEC. L.
& POLY 63, 77 (2010).
30. See Libicki, supra note 27, at 55 (noting the possibility of "sub rosa" cyber
attacks since "information systems are generally invisible" even if the artifacts of a
system may be seen).
31. See John Markoff, Attack of the Zombie Computers Is Growing Threat, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/07/technology/07net.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (noting that criminals are, "with growing
sophistication ... taking advantage of programs that secretly install themselves on
thousands or even millions of personal computers, band these computers together into
an unwitting army of zombies, and use the collective power of the dragooned network
to commit Internet crimes").
32. See id. (noting that botnets "are being blamed for the huge spike in spam
that bedeviled the Internet in recent months, as well as fraud and data theft" and that
security researchers "have been concerned about botnets for some time because they
automate and amplify the effects of viruses and other malicious programs").
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concealing their identities.3 3 In the case of hostile, state-sponsored
actions, the difficulty in identifying the genuine origin of damaging
information is only the first step in the arduous process of attributing
the transmission of such information to a responsible state. Next
comes the challenging task of establishing a legally sufficient
connection between an actor-who may appear to be a private person,
linked only to privately owned systems and networks-and a specific
government.
Determining the origin of information used in a hostile cyber
action, identifying its geographic contours, and attributing the
transmission of that information to specific persons and then to a
responsible state can thus be a Herculean task. This intractable
problem is clearly reflected in the current practice of states. One
important example of such state practice (or nonpractice) is found in
what some have referred to as the first cyber attack by one country on
another: the three-week wave of hostile cyber actions against
government, media, and financial websites and other computer
systems and networks in Estonia in 2007.34
While many observers alleged that the hostile cyber actions
taken against Estonia in 2007 were directed or sponsored by the
Russian government, the origin of these actions, their geographic
nexus, and the identity of the responsible parties remain unknown.3 5
Instead, investigators found only a shadowy world of "Russian
hacktivists," "criminal botnets," and a trail that ultimately led them
to computers located primarily in Western countries. 36 Similarly,
notwithstanding unofficial accounts of persons in the United States
allegedly participating in the deployment of the much-discussed
"Stuxnet worm" (a sophisticated malware program that was
apparently directed against Iranian nuclear facilities), the positive
33. See Nicole Perlroth, Researchers Say They Took Down World's Third-
Largest Botnet, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (July 18, 2012, 6:25 PM), http://bits.blogs.
nytimes.com/20 12/07/18/cybersecurity-researchers-say-they-took-down-worlds-third-
largest-botnet/ (noting that "[t]echnologists have taken the lead in combating digital
crime rather than waiting for law enforcement authorities to act" and how computer
security experts "took down ... a cluster of infected computers used by
cybercriminals ... that was responsible for roughly. .. 18 billion spam messages a
day").
34. See Peter Finn, Cyber Assaults on Estonia Typify a New Battle Tactic,
WASH. POST, May, 19, 2007, at Al (noting that Estonia "has been subject in recent
weeks to massive and coordinated cyber attacks on Web sites of the government,
banks, telecommunications companies, Internet service providers and news
organizations").
35. See Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable
Estonia, THE GUARDIAN (May 16, 2007), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/
may/17/topstories3.russia (stating that there is disagreement among experts as to
whether the identity of the "cyber-warriors" can be established).
36. Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, THE EcONOMIST, July 1, 2010, at 28;
see Hollis, supra note 25, at 405 ("We still do not know who authored the 2007 Estonia
attacks. . . .").
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identification of responsible persons or governments has been a
significant and elusive technical challenge. 37
It is thus for good reason that one scholar argues that while
"proponents of rules on cybercrime and cyberwar regularly assume
that sufficient attribution of an attack's origins can and will
occur.... In reality, however, anonymity, not attribution, prevails."38
The strategic significance of this phenomenon and the threat that it
presents to U.S. national interests has been duly noted by the DoD.39
While it may be tempting to dismiss attribution in cyberspace as a
mere technical problem waiting to be overcome, the unique properties
of information and the architecture of the Internet itself ensure that
this is a systemic problem. 40
The fundamental origin and attribution problems discussed
above cast long shadows over the application of IHL rules in
cyberspace and also over international law governing the right of
states to use armed force in response to perceived cyber attacks. As
expressed in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the jus ad bellum limits
the right of states to use armed force in self-defense to those
situations in which an "armed attack" occurs.41 This right to use
armed force in self-defense is also dependent on meeting a high
threshold for attribution of the armed attack.42
As discussed below, extraordinary difficulties in attributing the
information used in hostile cyber actions appear to significantly
impede efforts to characterize such actions as armed attacks
justifying the use of armed force in self-defense under the UN
Charter. As the world advances further and further into an apparent
age of cyber conflict, the continuing failure of states to treat
damaging cyber acts standing alone as armed attacks is highly
37. See The Stuxnet Outbreak: A Worm in the Centrifuge, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 30, 2010, at 63 (noting that "America and Israel are the obvious suspects. But
Stuxnet's origins and effects are unknown."); David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up
Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at Al (noting that while
forensic investigations into the inner workings of the Stuxnet "were successful in
picking apart how the code worked," those investigations "came to no conclusions about
who was responsible").
38. Hollis, supra note 25, at 377-78.
39. See DoD CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that "[o]ur
potential adversaries, both nations and non-state actors, clearly understand this
dynamic and seek to use the challenge of attribution to their strategic advantage").
40. Hollis, supra note 25, at 397 ('Those with sufficient technical skill can
remain anonymous at will. . . . This situation is unlikely to change anytime soon; it is a
systemic aspect of the Internet, not a simple problem to be fixed.").
41. U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.").
42. See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6) ("[Inn order to
establish that it was legally justified in attacking the Iranian platforms in exercise of
the right of individual self-defence, the United States has to show that attacks had
been made upon it for which Iran was responsible.").
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significant since the establishment of customary international law is
dependent on the finding of such state practice (done out of a sense of
legal obligation, or opinio juris).43
Notwithstanding the notable absence of supporting state practice
to this point in history, some authors suggest new norms that treat
destructive cyber operations as unlawful uses of force can be expected
to emerge. 44 However, drawing on extant (as opposed to desired) state
practice, one might also argue that the problematic characteristics of
information as a weapon and target are contributing to a reluctance
by states to embrace such a norm.
States have in fact to this point refrained from invoking the right
to self-defense in response to hostile cyber acts alone, even though
destructive cyber programs have been employed by states for many
decades. For example, in 1982 an early version of a "logic bomb"
(reportedly planted by the Central Intelligence Agency in a computer-
control system stolen by Soviet spies from a Canadian firm) caused a
malfunction in a Soviet gas pipeline in Siberia, resulting in a massive
explosion.45 States have also had access to harmful viruses and other
malicious computer programs since the early years of the Internet
itself.46
There is, however, no shortage of rhetoric from government
officials and military leaders warning that hypothetical, highly
destructive cyber acts in the future will be regarded as conventional
armed attacks and armed force will be used in response.4 7 States are
understandably unwilling to officially foreclose their right to use all
necessary means to respond to any serious threat, including the most
destructive cyber acts.48 However, to -this point, no state has used
armed forced against another state nor actually invoked its right to
43. See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 29, 27 (June 3) ("It
is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to be
looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States.").
44. See, e.g., Michael Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum
Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569, 588 (2012) (noting that "[i]n light of the increasing
frequency and severity of cyber operations, a tendency towards resolving grey areas in
favor of finding a use of f6rce can be expected to emerge").
45. See Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, supra note 36, at 25 (quoting the
memoirs of Thomas Reed, a former Air Force secretary, that the result of this logic
bomb "was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from
space").
46. See Markoff, supra note 31 (noting how "[p]lagues of viruses and other
malicious programs have periodically swept through the Internet since 1988, when
there were only 60,000 computers online").
47. See, e.g., Gorman, supra note 7 (quoting a U.S. military official as saying,
"If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your
smokestacks").
48. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE
14 (May 2011) ("We reserve the right to use all necessary means-diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic-as appropriate and consistent with applicable
international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our
interests.").
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do so in response to hostile cyber actions alone; nor has any state
claimed before the UN Security Council that hostile cyber actions
alone have made that state the victim of an armed attack and
reported actions taken pursuant to its right of self-defense (as
required by the UN Charter).49
Significantly, the much-discussed cyber actions taken against
Estonia in 2007 only reinforced this absence of state practice, since
Estonia never officially claimed to be the victim of an armed attack
before the UN Security Council and never invoked its right to self-
defense under Article 51. Instead, Estonia acknowledged great
difficulties in attributing responsibility for the attacks and generally
treated the incident as the work of criminal organizations.5 0 Rather
than attributing the actions to a foreign government, an Estonian
government official would later describe the event as "a mass cyber
riot."5 1
Any cyberwar narrative for the incidents that occurred in
Estonia in 2007 is also fundamentally at odds with the official
statements of both the Estonian Ministry of Defense and NATO
officials. 52 Furthermore, the Estonian minister of defense candidly
noted that "[n]ot a single Nato defence minister would define a cyber-
attack as a clear military action at present."5 3 Such current state
practice stands in stark contrast to alternate scenarios suggested by
some authors, in which states that suffer "massive cyber attacks,
similar to or more aggravated than those suffered by Estonia, may
choose to treat them as justifying a forceful response."54
In spite of the reality of current state practice, which rejects
equating hostile cyber acts with illegal uses of force, there is no
shortage of commentators, government officials, and former
49. UN Charter art. 51.
50. See C. CZOSSECK & K. GEERS, THE VIRTUAL BATTLEFIELD: PERSPECTIVES ON
CYBER WARFARE 186-87 (2009) (noting that cyber "attacks" on Estonia "resulted in the
arrest and successful prosecution of one Estonian citizen" and that the Estonian chief
prosecutor declared that "[w]e have no evidence and no information that this was the
Russian government").
51. See Andy Greenberg, When Cyber Terrorism Becomes State Censorship,
FORBES (May 14, 2008, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/05/14/cyberattacks-
terrorism-estonia-tech-security08-cx-ag_0514attacks.html (further noting that the
Estonian director of eGovernance specifically "discounted theories about the
involvement of the Russian government").
52. See Traynor, supra note 35 (quoting the Estonian defense minister as
saying that "[a]t present, Nato does not define cyber-attacks as a clear military action.
This means that the provisions of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, in other
words collective self-defence, will not automatically be extended to the attacked
country.").
53. Id.
54. See Schmitt, supra note 44, at 588 (further stating that "[i]f state practice
along these lines became widespread and well-accepted, the Article 51 norm would
shift accordingly through the natural process by which existing international law
remains current. For the moment, that has not occurred.").
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government officials (especially those who are now associated with
cyber security firms) offering sensationalized accounts of current or
imminent so-called cyberwars. 5 5 The word war in the context of
cyberspace has thus become more of a political or cultural term than
a legal one (joining "wars" against poverty, crime, drugs, and obesity),
with little relevance to the legal right of states to use armed force in
response to hostile cyber acts.
Setting aside sensationalized war rhetoric, the fundamental
problem of identifying the origin of information used in hostile cyber
acts continues to make it extremely difficult for states to equate such
acts with armed attacks justifying armed responses. The anonymity
of information and the structure of the Internet are more than simply
"factors" to be used in evaluating the legal status of hostile cyber acts.
Instead, origin and attribution problems have dominated all major
cases reported to date, impeding any effort to apply the jus ad bellum
regime to hostilities in cyberspace.56 These problems continue to
figure prominently in making contemporary reports of cyber attacks
phantoms under the jus ad bellum.
Systemic problems in identifying and legally attributing the
origins of information also fundamentally impair the meaningful
application of the jus in bello-that is, the IHL framework-to
conflicts in cyberspace. A conclusion that the IHL framework governs
particular events in cyberspace determines numerous issues,
including whether the domestic law enforcement model is displaced
in favor of the armed conflict model and whether key IHL rules
apply.5 7
The most important IHL obligations include requirements that:
(1) attacks must never be directed against civilian objects and must
always distinguish between civilian and military objectives (the
principles of discrimination and distinction); (2) attacks must not
cause injury or damage to civilian objects in excess of the concrete
and direct military advantage to be gained even when directed
against legitimate military objectives (the principle of
proportionality); and (3) those persons responsible for planning and
55. See Evgeny Morozov, Battling the Cyber Warmongers, WALL ST. J., May 8-
9, 2010, at W3, col. 1 (condemning "cyber-jingoism from former and current national
security officials," including those now associated with security firms who may have a
vested interest in exaggerating cyber threats).
56. For example, the origin of the "attacks" against Estonia was traced to at
least 177 countries other than Estonia. See Charles Clover, Kremlin-Backed Group
Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2009, 2:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/57536d5a-Oddc-1lde-8ea3-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2jcIdHjuX.
57. See generally GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 164-86 (2010)
(contrasting, in the context of terrorism, the "criminal justice model" characterized by
the traditional investigation of crimes and the arrest and trial of individuals for
violations of domestic law with the "military model" characterized by very different
detention practices, the permissive use of force, the application of the law of armed
conflict, and a focus on military objectives rather than on "justice").
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carrying out attacks must take all feasible precautions to ensure
adherence to the principles of distinction and proportionality
("precautionary measures").5 8
Both states and individuals are responsible for their conduct
under the IHL framework. 59 However, a state is only responsible for
IHL violations that can be legally attributed to that state. While
attribution may be a relatively routine matter in the context of many
conventional armed conflicts, the nature of information makes
attribution highly problematic for conflicts in cyberspace. In fact, it
has been suggested that this problem of attribution is perhaps the
most fundamental and serious challenge to the application of the IHL
framework to conflicts in cyberspace, as well as efforts to regulate
cybercrime.6 0
2. Information: The Problems of Organization and Armed Conflict
Classification
While attribution of responsibility for hostile cyber actions to
states is dominated by the problem of identifying the origin of those
actions, it can also be greatly affected by problems related to the way
persons can use information to anonymously organize themselves in
cyberspace. The absence of physical controls and the possibilities of
virtual organization may present significant obstacles to making the
legal determinations necessary to attribute cyber conduct by
individuals to states.
The establishment of an armed conflict and the classification of
that conflict are both critical threshold determinations for applying
the IHL framework. 61 These determinations may in turn depend on
the establishment of various degrees of organization and control of
the actors. While making such determinations may at times present
58. Protocol I, supra note 22, at arts. 51, 52, 57. These provisions reflect
customary international humanitarian law related to "precautions in attack." See
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & Louis DOSWALD-BECK, I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAw 51-67 (2005).
59. While states are clearly bound by the international legal obligations found
in treaties to which they are a party and by applicable rules of customary international
law, it is important to also note that the principle of individual responsibility (and
punishment) for crimes under international law (including the IHL framework) has
been described as the "cornerstone of international criminal law" and is the enduring
legacy of the Nuremberg Tribunals. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Opinion
and Judgment, $ 665 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997)
(internal citations omitted).
60. See Hollis, supra note 25, at 378 ("[Alnonymity makes it difficult-if not
impossible-for rules on either cybercrime or cyberwar to regulate or deter.").
61. See Kenneth Watkin, Chemical Agents and "Expanding" Bullets: Limited
Law Enforcement Exceptions or Unwanted Handcuffs?, 82 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 193,
199 (2006) ("The application of the law of war is dependent upon the categorization of
conflict.... [T]he establishment of law and order is ultimately dependent on the
drawing of jurisdictional lines.").
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vexing questions in the physical world, efforts to establish necessary
levels of organization and control in cyberspace confront even more
serious challenges.
In order for the IHL framework to apply, either an "international
armed conflict" or "noninternational armed conflict" is required. The
Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide that an international armed
conflict is present in "all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties."62 As further explained in the Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
(Commentary), the official International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) commentary on Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions,
"[A]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the
intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict
within the meaning of Article 2 .... "63
Because it focuses primarily on the actions of members of the
armed forces of states, the legal framework for attribution of
responsibility for IHL violations in conventional international armed
conflicts may be relatively uncomplicated. For example, it is not
controversial that responsibility for IHL violations can be attributed
to states based on the conduct of its military personnel. 64
In theory, then, if hostile cyber acts can be linked to the military
personnel of a state in an international armed conflict, related IHL
violations can be attributed to that state. That link may, of course, be
difficult to actually establish in light of the inherent difficulties
associated with identifying the origins of information in cyberspace.
Furthermore, establishing state control over other types of actors-
based on information residing in or passing through cyberspace-may
be even more difficult, significantly impeding the attribution of IHL
violations by those actors to a state.
In addition to state responsibility based on the conduct of its
military personnel, customary international law provides that a state
is also responsible for violations of IHL obligations by other persons
under various circumstances. These circumstances include violations
attributed to a state that are committed by "persons or entities it
62. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (This article is found in all four 1949
Geneva Conventions and thus is referred to as Common Article 2).
63. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF AUGUST 1949: 111 GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT
OF PRISONERS OF WAR art. 2, 1 1 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) (internal footnote omitted);
see also INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 62 (Yves Sandoz,
Christophe Swinkarsi & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] ("[H]umanitarian law ... covers any dispute between two
States involving the use of their armed forces.").
64. See Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 91 (providing that a party "shall be
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces").
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empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority," by
"persons or groups acting in fact on its instructions, or under its
direction or control," or by "private persons or groups which it
acknowledges and [whose conduct it] adopts as its own."65
While the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has acknowledged
that conduct by private persons or groups acting under the direction
or control of a state can be attributed to that state for purposes of IHL
violations, it has also established a very high standard for such
attribution. In Nicaragua v. United States, the court concluded that
for the United States to be held responsible for alleged IHL violations
committed by "Contra" paramilitaries operating in Nicaragua, it
would have to be established that the United States had "effective
control over the military or paramilitary operations in the course of
which the . . . violations [occurred]."66
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) has indicated that for some purposes, including establishing
individual criminal responsibility, "the extent of requisite State
control varies."67 Nonetheless, the ICJ has not abandoned the high
"effective control" threshold it established in the Nicaragua case for
attribution of conduct to states. 68
As demonstrated by the Nicaragua case and subsequent ICJ
decisions, sufficient state control for attribution purposes may be
difficult to establish in armed conflicts in the physical world in spite
of the availability of physical evidence and the significance of a state's
responsibility for conduct occurring on its own territory. With the
links between states and persons so difficult to establish in
cyberspace, proving effective state control over persons and groups in
cyberspace presents an even more daunting challenge.
The ability of individuals to use information to form loosely
affiliated cyber "groups" that collectively engage in destructive
actions presents a final, significant classification problem under the
IHL framework. Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions
establishes a second category of armed conflicts, referring to them
only as those "not of an international character occurring in the
65. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 58, rule 149, at 530.
66. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 115 (June 27).
67. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, IT 120, 137 (Int'l Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) ("[Flor the attribution to a State of acts of
these groups it is sufficient to require that the group as a whole be under the overall
control of the State.").
68. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 226, 60 (Dec. 19) (stating that it could not conclude that the
conduct of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo was '"on the instructions of, or
under the direction or control of' Uganda," thus not revisiting the question of "whether
the requisite tests [as set forth in the Nicaragua case] are met for sufficiency of control
of paramilitaries").
[VOL. 47-67
LEGAL PHANTOMS IN CYBERSPACE
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties."69 According to the
ICTY, these noninternational conflicts are characterized by
"protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."70
The requirement that noninternational armed conflicts reach a
particular level of intensity and involve the participation of organized
armed groups is well established.7 ' Such conflicts are to be contrasted
with other forms of violence to which the IHL framework does not
apply-namely, "situations of internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature."72 The phrase "situations of internal disturbances and
tensions" encompasses an extremely diverse set of acts that are
generally governed by the domestic criminal law of states. Such
disturbances and tensions could include many harmful actions of
individuals and groups operating in both physical domains and
cyberspace.
Through the use of information and the Internet, it is possible for
members of a decentralized online community, acting anonymously,
to engage in loosely coordinated, destructive actions-sometimes in
support of a particular government's interests (although their
connection with that government may be unclear or impossible to
establish). 7 These cyber communities can take advantage of the
ability of individual actors in cyberspace to use information to
coordinate damaging actions without a leadership structure, physical
interaction, or command and control systems. For example, one such
notorious "organization" known as Anonymous, which uses an image
69. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31.
70. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995); see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 619
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998) (citing this finding in Tadic).
71. Sylvain Vite, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian
Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 69, 76
(2009).
72. Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (distinguishing various
situations of internal disturbances and tensions from armed conflicts not of an
international character); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment (Trial
Chamber), 1 84 (Int'l Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) (distinguishing an
armed conflict "from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist
activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian law") (internal citation
omitted).
73. See, e.g., Michael Moynihan, You're Being Hacked; Cyberspies are
Everywhere. But Who are They Helping?, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 2013, at 1 (describing
the diverse, harmful cyber activities of various anonymous hacker collectives, including
one that calls itself "the Syrian Electronic Army" that supports Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad).
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of a suit without a head to represent its leaderless, anonymous
status, has been described as a loose "hacking collective." 74
The structural organization that characterizes an armed force in
conventional military operations involves varied elements of physical
command and control and discipline, allowing physical violence to be
organized and effectively directed against targets. Regardless of the
damage that cyber communities or collectives may cause, their
structurally limited, purely information-based coordination
capabilities and their inability to engage in protracted armed violence
make them highly unlikely to meet the thresholds for organization
and intensity required for armed groups in noninternational armed
conflicts.
To the extent that the IHL regime may require armed groups to
be sufficiently organized to impose discipline, engage in sustained
military operations, and exercise physical control over persons or
territory, the limitations of cyber groups further highlight the legal
significance of the distinction between physical and informational
organization. 75 It is thus not surprising that even writers who
emphasize the importance of the damaging consequences of cyber
actions conclude that "[i]t would be exceptionally difficult for cyber
operations standing alone to rise to the level of noninternational
armed conflict."76
3. Information: The Problem of Territory
In denying Russian responsibility for cyber actions that allegedly
emanated from Russian territory and damaged Estonian computer
systems and networks, the Russian ambassador to the European
Union famously remarked that "cyberspace is everywhere."7 7 Such
comments reflect the reality that the nonterritorial dimensions of
information in cyberspace pose serious challenges to establishing a
state's responsibility for actions on the basis that those actions
"originated from," "occurred," or "took place" on its territory.
Conventional legal concepts of responsibility based on physical
terrain and control of territory are fundamentally impaired by the
74. Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Interrupt Service at the C.I.A.'s Web Site, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, at B2.
75. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1, June
8, 1997, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol 1I] (applying a higher threshold than
Common Article 3 by referring to "organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol').
76. Michael Schmitt, Cyber Operations in International Law: The Use of Force,
Collective Security, Self-Defense, and Armed Conflicts, in PROCEEDINGS OF A
WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS 151, 176 (2010) [hereinafter CYBERAT'TACK
WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS].
77. Traynor, supra note 35.
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realities of cyberspace. Even if information used in a hostile cyber
action may eventually be traced to physical connections or nodes on
the territory of one state, many of the systems or networks involved
may be remotely controlled, as previously noted, by information
originating from the territory of another state. Finding a
"responsible" computer or network under these circumstances is
unlikely to implicate either individual or territorial state
responsibility since the hostile actions in question may have been
unauthorized or even unknown by the owner of the computer systems
or networks in question. 78 Furthermore, attribution of state
responsibility may be significantly impeded by the lack of government
control or even presence in cyberspace. Unlike other physical
domains, much of cyberspace is privately owned.79
Private ownership of much of cyberspace creates complex
relationships between states and private actors that cloud state
responsibility for actions involving the misuse of information at the
physical connections or terminals located on its territory. 80 These
relationships are further muddled by individual states' different
regulatory and legal systems governing the use of the Internet
(including restrictions on content and expression), access to privately
owned information systems, privacy rights, and the information
itself.81
While the links that connect information with territory, states,
and nonstate actors may be exceedingly tenuous or impossible to find,
some commentators have nonetheless argued that states should be
held responsible under various circumstances for "cyber attacks ...
continuously launched from within [their] borders."82 Assuming (with
difficulty) that the country of origin of a hostile cyber act can be
78. See MARTIN C. LIBICIU, CYBERDETERRENCE AND CYBERWAR 3-4 (2009)
("[M]illions, perhaps tens of millions, of computers today are bots, capable of being
controlled by nefarious others their owners have never met.").
79. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE 5 (2011)
[hereinafter DOD CYBERSPACE STRATEGY] ("[T]he networks and systems that make up
cyberspace are man-made, often privately owned, and primarily civilian in use. . . .").
80. See id. at 8 ("The challenges of cyberspace cross sectors, industries, and
U.S. government departments and agencies; they extend across national boundaries
and through multiple components of the global economy. Many of DoD's critical
functions and operations rely on commercial assets, including Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) and global supply chains, over which DoD has no direct authority to
mitigate risk effectively.").
81. The lack of international consensus in efforts to regulate cyberspace
illustrates these complex relationships. See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, The Shape of
Governance: Analyzing the World of Internet Regulation, 43 VA. J. INTL L. 605, 627-28
(2003) ("Any attempt to harmonize cyber-regulation on a global scale and by consensus
would have to overcome supreme hurdles. . . ."); Private Data, Public Rules, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2012, at 59 (noting that although states are making plans to
govern internet markets to protect privacy, "their approaches differ wildly").
82. E.g., David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L SEC.
L. & POL'Y 87, 94-95 (2010).
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identified, these theories posit that a state should be held responsible
for such acts if it serves as a "sanctuary" for nonstate actors engaging
in cyber attacks-as determined by that state's failure to enact and
enforce on its territory stringent criminal laws against such attacks,
to appropriately investigate them, and to fully cooperate with other
states in efforts to identify, apprehend, and punish those who engage
in these attacks.83
As a general matter, and particularly with respect to jus ad
bellum issues, state responsibility for actions-even physical ones-
that occur on its territory may often be overstated. At the outset, the
state's knowledge of such actions may not always be presumed.84 In
addition, even in the physical world, responsibility for those actions
must still be imputed to the authorities of that state.85 In cyberspace
this is of course highly problematic, especially since "[n]o method
exists of determining whether the individual at the other end of the
attacks is a government agent."8
With respect to the legal standard governing state responsibility
for the actions of groups operating on its territory, it has been
suggested that a new threshold, lower than the effective control
standard articulated in Nicaragua, has emerged as a result of the
actions taken against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in response
to the 9/11 attacks.87 As previously noted, however, a lower threshold
cannot be found in ICJ decisions, nor is it clearly reflected in state
practice, notwithstanding the exceptional circumstances surrounding
the intervention by NATO in Afghanistan in 2001.
83. See id. at 93-94 (assessing violations of state duties to prevent cyber
attacks).
84. The court found that
[iut cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State
over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to have
known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily
knew, or ought to have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from
other circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor shifts the
burden of proof.
See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 18 (April 9).
85. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1155 (June 27) ("[Elven supposing it well established that
military aid is reaching the armed opposition in El Salvador from the territory of
Nicaragua, it still remains to be proved that this aid is imputable to the authorities of
the latter country.").
86. Eric Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of
Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, STAN. J. INT'L L. 207, 234 (2002).
87. See Graham, supra note 82, at 96 (discussing arguments for increasing
state responsibility for actions of nonstate actors); see generally TAL BECKER,
TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 212-38
(2006) (reviewing arguments for and against Taliban responsibility for Al Qaeda's
actions on 9/11).
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The extraordinarily close relationship between Al Qaeda and the
Taliban regime resulted in a series of unprecedented sanctions by the
UN Security Council against the Taliban regime (prior to the 9/11
attacks) for its widely recognized, direct, and continuing support of Al
Qaeda, its leaders, and its terrorist activities. 88 These unique
circumstances make NATO's post-9/11 actions against the Taliban
regime a poor precedent upon which to build a case for a lowering of
the effective control threshold or for creating a new "sanctuary"
theory of state responsibility for the actions of groups in the physical
world, let alone for the actions of groups in cyberspace.
Sanctuary theories of state responsibility for cyber attacks
(based on a state's failure to enact and enforce on its territory
stringent criminal laws against harmful cyber actions) may appear
attractive, but they are not part of any obligations now expressed in
international conventions or customary international law. To the
extent any international consensus in this area can be said to be
developing, a representative, nonbinding UN General Assembly
resolution calls upon states to "ensure that their laws and practice
eliminate safe havens for those who criminally misuse information
technologies." 89 Unfortunately, this resolution refers neither to
"attacks" nor to IHL obligations.
Furthermore, even in areas of criminal activity that the
resolution is intended to address, its broad provisions have not yet
been implemented in any manner indicating consistent, widespread,
and conforming state practice. Instead, there continues to be a lack of
international consensus regarding some of the most fundamental
aspects of dealing with cybercrime and the misuse of information in
cyberspace.90
There currently is only one significant, binding, multilateral
agreement on the subject of cybercrime-the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime (CEC).9 1 The CEC may be an important
88. See Jack M. Beard, Military Action Against Terrorists Under International
Law: America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under International
Law, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POI'Y 559, 582-83 (2002) (also noting the unique
evidentiary standards the United States employed in making its case for an armed
response against the Taliban).
89. G.A. Res. 55/63, 1 1(a), U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/63 (Jan. 22, 2001); see also G.A.
Res. 45/121, 1 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/121 (Dec. 14, 1990).
90. See David Satola & Henry L. Judy, Electronic Commerce Law: Towards a
Dynamic Approach to Enhancing International Cooperation and Collaboration in
Cybersecurity Legal Frameworks: Reflections on the Proceedings of the Workshop on
Cybersecurity Legal Issues at the 2010 United Nations Internet Governance Forum, 37
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1745, 1772 (2011) (noting how delegates at the Twelfth UN
Crime Congress, held in April 2010 in Salvador, Brazil, were unsuccessful in
negotiating a new global cybercrime treaty because issues there presented countries
with "inherently conflicting policy objectives and cultural clashes, including the need to
balance different interests and rights such as security and privacy").
91. Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, Nov. 23, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 282,
2296 U.N.T.S. 167 (ratified by the United States in 2006, entered into force in 2007).
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first step in protecting society from cybercrime by seeking to
"harmonize national laws on cybercrime, improve national
capabilities for investigating such crimes, and increase cooperation on
investigations." 92 However, to date, only a modest number of states
(mostly European ones) are parties to the CEC, and those states are
also all able to take reservations in nine key designated areas.93
Furthermore, the CEC does not address state sponsorship or support
of harmful cyber activities (including espionage and cyber attacks) or
state responsibility for actions under either the jus in bello or jus ad
bellum. 94
Rather than establishing a new norm of customary international
law regarding state territorial responsibility for cyber attacks, state
practice in this area instead reflects conscious neglect, confusion, lack
of consensus, and enormous practical and legal difficulties in both
determining the origin of hostile cyber actions and in imposing a
territorial model on them. The current shadowy world of cybercrime
and the related-and often indistinguishable-world of state-
sponsored espionage and sabotage thrive on the lack of territorial
boundaries in cyberspace, the invisible nature of information, and the
lack of coordination and cooperation between states on cyber issues.
Varied types of hackers, hacktivists, and state-sponsored actors
engage in diverse acts of mischief, crime, and destruction in
cyberspace on a daily basis. 9 Most of these actors operate with
impunity and successfully evade or manipulate the territorial
boundaries of the states in which they operate, as demonstrated by
the incredible lack of accountability for cyber threats under domestic
legal regimes.96 This profound inability of states to impose their own
domestic criminal laws on cyber events that "occur" within their
territories vividly illustrates the fragile nature of state territorial
92. Michael A. Vatis, The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, in
CYBERArrACK WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 76, at 207 (internal citation
omitted).
93. States Party are permitted to make reservations in nine areas under
Article 42. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 91, at art. 42. As of December 31,
2013, 41 states were parties to the Convention. See Convention on Cybercrime,
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/print/ChercheSig.asp?
NT=185& CL-ENG (last updated Jan. 5, 2014).
94. See Vatis, supra note 92, at 220 ("Moreover, the Convention does not
address the particular concerns that may be raised by cyber attacks that are not just
criminal acts, but may also constitute espionage or the use of force under the laws of
war.").
95. See The Nomination of John 0. Brennan to be Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Select Intelligence, 113th
Cong. (2013) (statement of John 0. Brennan, Nominee, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency) ("U.S. computer networks and databases are under daily cyber
attack by nation states, international criminal organizations, subnational groups, and
individual hackers.").
96. See Hollis, supra note 25, at 404 ("[L]egal accountability for cyberthreats is
exceedingly rare. At most, five percent of cybercriminals are arrested or convicted.").
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control and responsibility over hostile uses of information in
cyberspace and should caution against the summary application of
international law on this basis.
It is true that a state may have an obligation to exercise "due
diligence" in order to prevent conduct contrary to international law
within its territory and to prosecute and punish such conduct if it
occurs. 9 However, the absence of agreed legal obligations with
respect to hostile cyber actions, the pervasive use of commandeered
computer systems and networks, the transnational dimensions of
information in cyberspace, and the widespread involvement of private
entities and private property all work to impede clear findings of
state responsibility with respect to the transmission of damaging
information.
4. Information: The Problems of Unlimited Availability and
Ubiquitous Processors
As noted above, the predominance of privately owned assets in
cyberspace and the widespread availability of information and
sophisticated information technologies give rise to unparalleled
asymmetric warfare capabilities. Because of the exceedingly low
barriers to entry in the arena of information (anyone can create it)
and the acquisition of information technology (almost anyone can buy
it), even the most powerful states are facing serious cyber threats
from an unprecedented number of new actors.98 In fact, states are
already being subjected, on a daily basis, to costly intrusions by
adversaries with increasingly sophisticated cyber capabilities.9 9
While state actors are generally responsible for the operation of
various sophisticated weapon systems and armaments such as tanks,
ballistic missiles, and warships, those who possess information and
who operate potentially harmful information technologies operate in
a new sort of "weapons commons." Nonstate actors, notably
transnational terrorist organizations, have long known the value of
the Internet as a means of financing and publicizing terrorist
activities and recruiting new members-making information
technologies and interconnectedness key aspects of modern
97. See Marco Sass6li, State Responsibility for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, 84 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSs 401, 411-12 (2002) (discussing
state responsibility for violations of IHL obligations based on lack of due diligence).
98. See Lynn, supra note 17, at 98-99 ("A dozen determined computer
programmers can, if they find a vulnerability to exploit, threaten the United States'
global logistics network, steal its operational plans, blind its intelligence capabilities,
or hinder its ability to deliver weapons on target.").
99. See DOD CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 79, at 3 ("Foreign cyberspace
operations against U.S. public and private sector systems are increasing in number
and sophistication. DoD networks are probed millions of times every day, and
successful penetrations have led to the loss of thousands of files from U.S. networks
and those of U.S. allies and industry partners.").
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insurgencies. 100 Now a variety of cyber tools and methods,
representing a new set of asymmetric warfare capabilities, are also
available to these groups as potential weapons to inflict damage on
their enemies.
A powerful addition to the cyber capabilities of nonstate actors
may ironically come from the arsenals of the most technologically
advanced states. Soon after powerful states use their most
sophisticated cyber weapons, the information necessary to recreate
these weapons may be readily available for downloading from the
Internet. This phenomenon, which is said to be illustrated by
information now available about the Stuxnet worm, has led some
commentators to observe that the most sophisticated state-developed
cyber capabilities may quickly become "open source" weapons once
they are used.10 1
These developments mean that states now confront a vast array
of new methods and means of warfare, a host of new cyber actors, and
an abundance of new places from which hostile cyber actions against
them can be taken. This reality of so many easily armed, diverse, and
dangerous actors fundamentally complicates the task of determining
the origin of specific hostile actions. 10 2 While many physical weapons
may be distributed widely among nonstate actors, such weapons have
physical properties and present physical evidence of their possession
and use; such evidence is not present in the transmission of various
types of information through cyberspace.
The abundance of actors in cyberspace and the widespread
availability of new information weapons also raise difficult questions
about the IHL status of the many persons who design and create
computer programs, use the computer systems and networks, or
contribute in other ways to processing or managing information
packages that may be used in hostile cyber acts. Under IHL rules,
civilians enjoy a protected status and are immune from attack unless
they take a "direct" or "active" part in hostilities.10 3 The dawn of a
new era of abundant information weapons presents the unsettling
possibility of an expanded and ambiguous type of involvement by the
civilian population in armed conflicts.
100. See U.S. ARMY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL
No. 3-24, ch. 1, 22 (Dec. 2006) ("Using the Internet, insurgents can now link virtually
with allied groups throughout a state, a region, and even the entire world.").
101. See Evan Pickworth, Bank Cyber Fraud More Lucrative Than Drugs Trade,
MAIL & GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2011) (noting the "major risk" in "the growth in usage of
open source weapons like the Stuxnet virus that is freely available online for
download").
102. See DOD CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT, supra note 5, at 8 ("The often low
cost of developing malicious code and the high number and variety of actors in
cyberspace make the discovery and tracking of malicious cyber tools difficult.").
103. See International Humanitarian Law, supra note 10, at 734 ("The notion of
'direct' or 'active' participation in hostilities, which is derived from Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions, is found in multiple provisions of IHL.").
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The question of what constitutes "direct participation in
hostilities" already raises difficult issues in conventional armed
conflictS. 104 In light of the diverse types of actions that can be
performed by individuals as they create, process, or otherwise use
abundant information resources-from designing malware to
managing websites or simply processing data-questions of civilian
immunity under the IHL framework become even more complex.
The many interrelated activities that may be involved in the
processing or management of information related to a particular
hostile cyber action will also raise difficult questions about the
specific conditions under which civilians involved in these activities
could lose their immunity from direct attack. If, for example, civilians
are immune from direct attack "unless and for such time as they
take a direct part in hostilities,"10 5 defining the precise temporal
period of an individual's work on a computer during which he or
she could be legally susceptible to attack may present some serious
challenges.
Difficulties in determining the status of individuals engaged in
cyber activities in the context of noninternational armed conflicts
present further challenges. In order to distinguish civilians in these
conflicts from members of insurgencies and other organized armed
groups of nonstate actors, the ICRC takes a functional approach by
suggesting that such armed groups "consist only of individuals whose
continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities
('continuous combat function')." 106 Thus, if the IHL regime is
extended to encompass cyber activities in these conflicts, this
approach will likely raise problematic questions about the status of
persons who, by continuously engaging in various damaging, diverse,
and interrelated information and computer activities (including the
preparation, execution, or command of such activities), are said to
assume a continuous combat function that amounts to direct
participation in hostilities.
104. In spite of the serious legal consequences that are attached to the phrase
"direct participation in hostilities," no definition of the conduct by civilians that would
render them subject to attack under this standard is found in the Geneva Conventions
or their Additional Protocols.
105. Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 51(3). This standard, suggesting only a
temporal loss of protection, has not achieved universal acceptance. The United
States, for example, is not a party to Protocol I, and its military regulations provide
only that noncombatants may not be deliberately attacked, "unless they forgo their
protection by taking a direct part in hostilities." DEP'T OF THE NAVY & DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., COMMANDERS HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP
1-14M, T 8.2.4 (July 2007).
106. NILS MELZER, INVL COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAw 27, 34 (2009) (further noting that "individuals whose continuous
function involves the preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations
amounting to direct participation in hostilities are assuming a continuous combat
function").
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Specific and widely acknowledged examples of direct
participation in hostilities by civilians in information-related cyber
actions are difficult to find. The ICRC broadly identifies "interfering
electronically with military computer networks" as an example of an
act causing "military harm to another party," which could potentially
make a civilian subject to attack for as long as he or she carries out
such an act.107 This example may, however, raise more questions
than it answers. Which personnel working with computer programs
and information systems are included in the description of
"interfering electronically" with an adversary's computer networks?
What are their duties? For how long are the individuals engaged in
these and related computer or information processing activities
susceptible to attack?
Conflict in cyberspace does not focus on the operation of
conventional weapons but instead on the use of information through
the deployment of malware and computer programs that include
worms, viruses, logic bombs, and an infinite variety of other
damaging data packages. Determining the participation of a civilian
in hostilities based on the role he or she plays in managing and
processing such information-as part of the deployment of a cyber
weapon-may present much more complicated scenarios than those
associated with conventional weapons that depend on the simple
launching, motion, and impact of physical objects or the application of
other physical forces.
While the parameters of IHL rules in this area remain uncertain,
any broad definition of direct participation in hostilities, in the vast
realm of cyber space, risks making many civilian personnel who work
with interrelated and diverse types of information and information
technologies susceptible to attack. This problem may be significantly
complicated by the blurred line between personal and work-related
activities that many civilian workers often cross as they process
information on their laptop computers, iPhones, and other electronic
means of accessing the Internet. Although individuals with laptops
sitting in coffee shops may routinely pursue harmful cyber activities
and may also undertake work-related activities involving state-
sponsored cyber activities, the prospect of expanding an existing
armed conflict by imposing the IHL regime on such individuals,
potentially subjecting them to lawful attack, is an alarming prospect.
In terms of military operations, a large number of diverse
technicians and specialists, many of them civilian, may routinely be
involved in interrelated computer and information activities,
potentially including those required to access enemy computer
systems and direct harmful cyber actions against them. It is thus not
107. Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions and Answers, INT'L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
documents/faq/direct-participation-ihl-faq-020609.htm.
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surprising that the ICRC notes with concern the reality that a wide
variety of civilian specialists may be called upon to assist members of
the armed forces of a state in conducting a hostile cyber action.10 8 A
serious and daunting task will thus confront military planners and
their legal staffs: determining which information-related activities by
an enemy are so integral to military operations or "intrinsic to a
particular cyber process" that they will make the personnel involved
in those activities subject to attack based on their direct participation
in hostilities. 09
More broadly, such concerns highlight the dangers of
imprudently extending the IHL framework to encompass many
information activities. An overbroad application of the concept of
direct participation in hostilities into the realm of information
processing could in fact threaten the fundamental purposes of the
IHL regime in the modern information age, potentially exposing vast
areas of existing civilian activity to targeting and attack.
II. INFORMATION AS A WEAPON AND TARGET: PROBLEMS
OF ACCESS AND CONTROL
A. Accessing Information: 'Acts of Violence"Against
"Objects of Attack"?
Rather than blasting or physically forcing its way into an
adversary's systems or networks, a hostile cyber act uses information
to persuade targeted systems or networks to grant admittance. 1 0
While these acts involve "penetrating" enemy systems or networks,
they are commenced and conducted essentially as unauthorized acts
of accessing information.
The nature of hostile cyber acts-in which information in
systems and networks must first be accessed by "persuasion"-makes
these acts highly unusual candidates for regulation under either the
jus ad bellum or jus in bello. No physical objects are destroyed by the
hostile cyber access itself; no planes, missiles, shells, bombs, or other
physical objects fall on enemy forces or land on the territory of a
108. See DORMANN, supra note 23, at 8 (noting that "[t]here is a strong
likelihood that civilians will be involved in [CNAs] often due to their specific technical
expertise, which members of the armed forces may not necessarily have. This
involvement can take a variety of forms.").
109. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for
Cyberwar, 5 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 81, 90 (2011).
110. MARTIN C. LIBICIG, CONQUEST IN CYBERSPACE: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INFORMATION WARFARE 35 (2007) (arguing that since computer networks are under the
ultimate control of the owner, "there is no such thing as forced entry in cyberspace")
(emphasis omitted).
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foreign state; and no physical forces or physical objects are directed
against the military forces of an adversary.
Countless acts of unauthorized access to computer systems and
networks occur every day around the world (including diverse forms
of cyber espionage), but these acts are routinely addressed as
criminal, civil, or administrative matters under domestic laws and
regulations-and not as acts of war that implicate the jus ad bellum
and IHL framework.' However, as noted above, only illegal "acts of
force" implicate the jus ad bellum, and only "the most grave" forms of
the use of force satisfy the requirements for an armed attack
justifying an armed response under the UN Charter. The most
common characteristics and effects of illegally accessing computer
systems and networks fall far short of the high standards for an
armed attack under the jus ad bellum, even if one assumes that other
key requirements, such as attribution, can be met.
Acts involving unauthorized access to computer systems and
networks are also particularly difficult to reconcile with the model
upon which the modern international legal system is founded: state
sovereignty over territory. A nonphysical information "incursion" into
an adversary's computer systems or networks is not equivalent to the
invasion of another state's territory. Without such a physical
incursion into anther state's territory by objects or enemy personnel,
the negative effects of cyber actions lack a fundamental component of
illegal uses of force as they are ordinarily assessed under the jus ad
bellum.
In terms of the jus in bello, the legal threshold for the application
of the IHL framework under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is, as
noted above, the presence of an "armed conflict." In the broadest
terms, such a conflict can be said to exist "whenever there is a resort
to armed force between States.""2
Since armed force necessarily implicates some variation of a
clash or contest of arms, the definition of arms plays a part in
delineating the concept of "armed force." As noted above, the
expansive phrase "weapon, means or method of warfare" appears to
be able to encompass harmful cyber techniques, technologies, and
computer programs. If so, the use of cyber weapons or techniques
could qualify as a "resort to arms" between opposing military forces in
an international armed conflict.
111. JAMES ANDREW LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES, THE CYBER
WAR HAS NOT BEGUN 2 (2010), available at http://csis.org/files/publication/
100311_TheCyberWarHasNotBegun.pdf ("Espionage and crime in cyberspace are
routine occurrences, but they are not acts of war and do not justify the use of military
force in response.").
112. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ! 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995).
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Notwithstanding potentially broad definitions of arms and
armed conflicts, the IHL framework was never intended to apply to
every type of harmful, unfriendly, or unwanted action that states are
capable of taking against each other. Instead, as emphasized by the
ICRC, "IHL is the body of rules applicable when armed violence
reaches the level of armed conflict, and is confined only to armed
conflict."It3 The presence of "armed violence" is thus central to the
IHL regime. Furthermore, the regime's obligations and restrictions
are intended to apply to a specific type of armed violence: an attack.
The term attack has been correctly referred to as "of decisive
importance" in the application of key IHL rules.114 Protocol I, which
represents the most widely accepted and authoritative statement of
IHL obligations, does not define an attack merely in terms of harmful
consequences; instead the protocol's Article 49 describes an attack as
"[an] act[] of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in
defence."" 5
The emphasis on acts of violence in the text of Article 49
suggests that attacks are dependent on a finding of "physical force,"
thus excluding other harmful, nonphysical acts. 116 The ICRC
interpretation in the Commentary to Protocol I simply confirms that
"[tihe term 'attack' means 'combat action."' 7
Proponents of the proposition that harmful consequences alone
determine the threshold for an attack have argued that the drafters
of Protocol I did not envision modern military capabilities other than
those involving "the immediate release of violent kinetic forces."" 8
Yet it is unclear why "kinetic forces" alone-as opposed to the broader
and more familiar concept of physical forces and objects-should be
the key in making this determination."i 9 Indeed, as reflected in the
113. International Humanitarian Law, supra note 10, at 722 (emphasis in
original).
114. Id. The term attack is found sixty-seven times in the text of Protocol I.
115. Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 49 (emphasis added).
116. MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 289 (1982) (noting that "[t]he term 'acts of violence'
denotes physical force. Thus, the concept of 'attacks' does not include dissemination of
propaganda, embargoes, or other non-physical means of psychological or economic
warfare."). Notwithstanding the authors' comments on the overall purposes of Protocol
I, they properly note its unmistakable focus on "physical force." Id.
117. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 63, $ 1880.
118. Michael N. Schmitt, "Attack" as a Term of Art in International Law: The
Cyber Operations Context, 4TH INT'L CONF. ON CYBER CONFLICT 283, 290 (C. Czosseck
& Ziolkowski eds., 2012).
119. Weapon systems that utilize objects in motion, thus employing kinetic
energy, are only one type of conventional weapon system now used by military forces in
physical domains. As noted above, the U.S. Air Force uses the phrase "non-kinetic" to
refer to actions "that produce effects without direct use of the force or energy of moving
objects," thus excluding various conventional weapons such as those that utilize
electromagnetic radiation or directed energy. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR
FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-5, INFORMATION OPERATIONS 116 (Aug. 5, 1998).
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Commentary to Protocol I, the threshold for establishing an attack
and an act of violence focuses on combat and physical force (which, in
its most common understanding, involves the employment of physical
forces or objects) and not on the narrower concept of kinetic forces.
From its formative stages, the IHL framework was not centered
on the possible effects of many different types of harmful state
conduct but instead on the physical violence associated with a broad
range of weapons employing physical forces and objects (not merely
"violent kinetic forces"). Thus, the foundational 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions included not only restrictions on projectiles, munitions,
and weapons employing kinetic forces but also a ban on the use of
poison. 120 The employment of the destructive physical properties of
both chemical and bacteriological (later biological) weapons was also
formally banned soon after in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. 121
In spite of the IHL regime's undisputed foundations on physical
acts of violence, it has become fashionable among some writers to
argue that hostile cyber acts should be included within the scope of
attacks because cyber capabilities belong to a subset of physical
weapons referred to as nonkinetic weapons. 122 In support of this
proposition, operations involving chemical and biological weapons are
incongruously cited as precedents for equating cyber weapons with
"other" nonkinetic weapons on the basis of their destructive
consequences.123
As noted, however, the historic focus in the IHL regime has been
on physical forces and objects, which has always included a smaller
subset of various nonkinetic, physical weapons, ranging from older
versions, such as poison and dangerous pathogens, to modern
versions, such as electromagnetic radiation and other directed energy
weapons. Information weapons, which lack the legally significant
120. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631; Hague Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex (Regulations) art. 23(a), Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295, 1 Bevans 643; Hague Convention (II) Respecting to the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, Annex (Regulations) art. 23(a), July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.
1811, 1 Bevans 252.
121. See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,
26 U.S.T 571 (restating and reaffirming the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons
and extending it to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare).
122. See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 238
(2009) (arguing that destructive CNAs qualify as "attacks" under Protocol I because
that term is properly interpreted to "extend to violent consequences of an attack which
does not consist of the use of kinetic force").
123. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key
Issues, 87 INT'L L. STUD. SERIES, U.S. NAVAL WAR. C. 89, 94 (2011) ("[It has always
been the case that operations employing biological contagions or chemicals have been
characterized as attacks, even though non-kinetic in nature, because their
consequences could prove harmful, even lethal.").
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physical attributes, characteristics, and capabilities of ihysical
weapons, are another matter.
The fundamental differences between physical weapons and
hostile uses of information are not usefully explained by referring to
cyber capabilities as nonkinetic. This nonkinetic lens is equally
unhelpful in explaining the critical differences between hostile cyber
acts and the physical use of armed force for purposes of the jus ad
bellum, although some authors employ this lens-again relying on
the inapt comparison to biological and chemical weapons-to equate
these acts on the basis of their destructive effects.' 24
State practice, to this point in history, continues to support the
clear focus of the IHL framework on acts of physical violence
(involving weapons that employ physical forces or objects) as opposed
to a focus on merely the effects of many varied, harmful state actions.
The process of accessing data in an unauthorized manner, however,
bears little resemblance to the acts of physical violence that the IHL
framework was designed to regulate.' 2 5 The nonviolent nature of such
cyber acts is reflected in the innumerable, diverse forms of unfriendly
and damaging actions in cyberspace that occur, and will continue to
occur, on a daily basis around the world outside of armed conflict and
outside the IHL framework.
As noted, the international community has collectively decided to
exclude a variety of harmful, nonphysical acts from both the jus ad
bellum and IHL framework, including damaging acts of espionage,
subversion, and political and economic coercion. In the absence of any
state practice, it has nonetheless been argued that the IHL
framework should be applied to nonphysical hostile cyber acts when
they result in serious physical damages.
Yet to encompass within the IHL framework a vast new set of
nonphysical actions-involving the uninvited accessing of information
and then subsequent acts of denial of service, exploitation, or
manipulation of data-is a highly significant and problematic step,
one which remains dependent on state practice (in the continuing
absence of any relevant international agreements). Significantly, not
a single state has actually embraced this innovation with respect to
124. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 44, at 573 (arguing that "[i]t would be no less
absurd to suggest that cyber operations that generate consequences analogous to those
caused by kinetic force lie beyond the [reach of the prohibition on the use of force], than
to exclude other destructive non-kinetic actions, such as biological or radiological
warfare'). Unlike information in computer codes, such WMDs have physical attributes
and properties and utilize physical agents to cause harm. See THOMAS RID, CYBER WAR
WILL NOT TAKE PLACE 13 (2012) (noting how some weapons, such as biological and
chemical weapons, rely on neither physical force nor energy but instead on "agents" to
do the work of harming targets).
125. Cyber techniques and methodologies may in fact broadly represent "a
computer-aided assault on violence itself." See id. at xiv (further arguing that by
offering various ways to achieve objectives without resorting to physical violence,
"cyber attacks help to diminish rather than accentuate political violence").
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real (as opposed to hypothetical) cyber incidents, in spite of the
expanding universe of hostile cyber acts affecting the financial,
industrial, and security interests of states, including acts targeting
critical components of their national infrastructure.126
The nonviolent, nonphysical nature of a hostile cyber act itself is
only one characteristic that makes such an act unusual for purposes
of both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Another unusual
characteristic concerns the diverse, highly ambiguous, and often
temporary effects of these acts, which are directly related to the
central role that information plays in constituting targets in
cyberspace.
An immense array of potential information targets is emerging
in cyberspace, accompanied by new cyber techniques capable of
damaging, denying, or disrupting them. Governments apparently
continue to direct their military forces and intelligence organizations
to identify and pursue new opportunities to advance national security
objectives by engaging in hostile cyber acts against many of these
information targets.
New information targets of potential interest to the military
include websites and other portals on the Internet used by
adversaries-valuable targets that may be difficult if not impossible
to destroy with physical force and conventional weapons. For
example, the head of the U.S. Cyber Command and Director of the
National Security Agency, General Keith Alexander, reportedly called
for cyber capabilities to be used to block the publication of an "online
jihadist magazine" because such a cyber action would be against "a
legitimate counterterrorism target and would help protect U.S. troops
overseas." 127 Along similar lines, even the U.S. State Department
apparently has employed cyber capabilities to disable foreign
websites associated with Al Qaeda.128
A state may thus perceive numerous military, security, or
political advantages in undertaking hostile cyber acts that interrupt,
126. See, e.g., STAFF OF CONGRESSMEN EDWARD J. MARKEY & HENRY A.
WAXMAN, ELECTRIC GRID VULNERABILITY: INDUSTRY RESPONSES REVEAL SECURITY
GAPS 11 (May 21, 2013) (noting that more than a dozen utilities in the United States
reported "daily," "constant," or "frequent" attempted cyber attacks "ranging from
phishing to malware infection to unfriendly probes;" that one utility reported that it
was "the target of approximately 10,000 attempted cyber-attacks each month," and
that other public power providers said that they "were under a 'constant state of attack'
from malware and entities seeking to gain access to internal systems").
127. See Nakashima, supra note 21, at A3 (noting how British "cyber-warriors"
reportedly temporarily succeeded in disrupting the website hosting the magazine and
garbling its bomb-making instructions).
128. See Hillary Clinton Boasts of US Cyberwar Against al-Qaeda, TELEGRAPH
(May 24, 2012), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-
qaeda/9286546/Hillary-Clinton-boasts-of-US-cyberwar-against-al-Qaeda.html ("In a
rare public admission of the covert cyber war against extremists, the Secretary of State
said cyber experts based at her department hacked Yemeni tribal websites, and took
down messages about killing Americans.").
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disable, or deny access to adversary websites and computer systems,
even if the effects are temporary. Such temporary effects on these
targets are, however, unlikely to meet the threshold for attacks under
the IHL regime.
The view requiring a minimum threshold of damage in order for
cyber acts to constitute attacks is widely held, and its proponents
include some writers who advocate a consequentialist approach to
cyber conflict.' 2 9 However, it has also been suggested that a broad
range of cyber actions that disable targets should also qualify as
attacks. 130 A legal advisor at the ICRC has also suggested that
specially protected objects, such as hospitals and medical units, must
not only be protected from attacks but also from all harm and
interference, arguably including low levels of cyber interference.131 To
argue, however, that various types of temporary cyber interference,
annoyance, mischief, and disruption should constitute attacks subject
to IHL restrictions risks dangerously overextending the IHL regime
and further highlights the dangers of legally equating the
informational with the physical.
While disruptive cyber acts may significantly interfere with
activities that rely on timely access to denied information, the actual
damages caused to targeted systems and networks are likely to be
temporary in nature.13 2 This phenomenon illustrates an important
aspect of information as a target in cyberspace: unlike the natural
environments of land, sea, air, and space, cyberspace is a human
construct. This means that cyberspace is replicable, and thus damage
to it can be repaired.133
The unusual, replicable character of cyberspace and the
ambiguous effects of many hostile cyber actions are implicitly
reflected in the once widely used term "computer network attack"
129. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack
and Jus in Bello, 84 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 365, 374 (2002) ("[Hlumanitarian
law would not pertain to disrupting a university intranet, downloading financial
records, shutting down Internet access temporarily or conducting cyber espionage,
because, even if part of a regular campaign of similar acts, the foreseeable
consequences would not include injury, death, damage or destruction.").
130. See DORMANN, supra note 23, at 6 (noting that since the definition of
military objectives in Article 52.2 of Protocol I discusses "neutralization" of those
objectives, "[i]t is irrelevant whether an object is disabled through destruction or in any
other way").
131. Id. Protocol I provides that "[m]edical units shall be respected and protected
at all times and shall not be the object of attack." Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 11.1
(emphasis added).
132. See Martin C. Libicki, Cyberwar as a Confidence Game, 5 STRATEGIC STUD.
Q. 132, 133 (2011) ("The direct effects of cyber attacks are almost always temporary.
Rarely is anything broken (the Stuxnet worm perhaps a prominent exception). At the
risk of a little oversimplification, because a cyber attack consists of feeding systems the
wrong instructions, replacing such instructions in favor of the original correct
instructions returns control to the owner.").
133. LIBICKI, supra note 110, at 5.
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(CNA). CNAs have been defined as "[a]ctions taken through the use of
computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and
networks themselves." 134 Words like "disrupt" or "deny" may, of
course, describe actions with only limited, temporary effects on the
ability to access information. 13 s
Hostile cyber acts encompassed by the term CNA may thus have
consequences that range from serious damage to no damage at all.
Within this range of effects, there are numerous types of nuisance,
mischief, inconvenience, disruption, or denial that clearly do not rise
to the level of armed attacks for purposes of attacks under the jus in
bello or armed attacks under the jus ad bellum. Consequently, the
term CNA is a poor tool for legal analysis, although it remains a
useful illustration of the spectrum of events occurring in cyberspace.
The difficulty in equating temporary, disruptive cyber acts with
armed attacks, even if undertaken on a massive scale against one
country, is clearly reflected in current state practice. As noted above,
the international community in general, and NATO states in
particular, explicitly refrained from characterizing the disruptive
cyber actions that paralyzed Estonia in 2007 as an armed attack or
even as "a clear military action."136 Such state practice stands, at
least for now, in stark contrast to suggestions that if Russia were
found legally responsible for the cyber actions against Estonia in
2007, the international community would or should have regarded
them as illegal uses of force under the UN Charter.13 7
Evaluating the legal status of the effects of hostile cyber acts also
focuses attention on the nature of the target. In implementing the
fundamental principle of distinction, Protocol I requires that attacks
be directed only against "military objectives," which are limited to
"those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage."138
134. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED
TERMS, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, at 95 (amended through Apr. 2010).
135. Words like "degrade" and "destroy" imply more lasting damage, but as
discussed in Part IV below, such terms require an examination of the targeted
information (particularly its content and users) in order to determine if legal
thresholds for armed attack or acts of violence are met.
136. See Traynor, supra note 35 ("Not a single [NATO] defence minister would
define a cyber-attack as a clear military action at present.").
137. See, e.g., CYBERATTACK WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 76, at 157
(arguing that "had Russia been responsible for [the cyber actions against Estonia]
under international law, it is likely that the international community would (or should
have) have treated them as a use of force in violation of the UN Charter and customary
international law").
138. Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 52, T 2; see also CYBERATTACK WORKSHOP
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 76, at 154.
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In assessing the English text of Protocol I, the Commentary
concluded that the word object refers to "something placed before the
eyes, or presented to the sight or other sense, an individual thing
seen, or perceived, or that may be seen or perceived; a material
thing."1 39 It further concluded that in both English and French, it was
clear the word object "means something that is visible and
tangible." 140
The nonphysical objects of disruptive hostile cyber acts are thus
highly unusual "objects of attack" for purposes of the IHL framework.
The resulting effects may also be very difficult to categorize as the
sort of physical damages (death, injury, or destruction of physical
objects) that have long served as the basis for applying IHL
obligations and restrictions. Even those who emphasize consequences
in assessing the legal status of cyber acts may express reservations
about treating data as an object of attack. 141 An additional,
important, and unresolved issue hanging over the question of
whether data can constitute an object of attack is the problem of its
content, which is discussed in Part IV.
B. Controlling, Confining, and Segregating Information
Information, as it resides in or passes through cyberspace, may
be much more difficult to control, confine, and segregate than
physical objects and forces passing over or through the physical
features of land, sea, air, and space. This characteristic ensures that
information presents its own set of significant challenges related to
the observance of the IHL principles of distinction and
proportionality.
If in fact the IHL regime does apply to a particular cyber
operation, those who plan or decide upon an attack must take various
precautionary measures to ensure compliance with the principles of
distinction and proportionality. These obligations require responsible
planners and decision makers to, among other things, "do everything
feasible" to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military
objectives and not civilians or civilian objects; "take all feasible
precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack" in order to
avoid or minimize incidental damage or injury to the civilian
population; and "refrain from deciding to launch any attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life . . . which
139. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 63, T 2007.
140. Id. 2008.
141. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 123, at 96 ("Absent an agreed-upon
interpretation in the cyber context, it is perhaps best to tread lightly in characterizing
data as an object."). Similarly, for purposes of the jus ad bellum, see CYBERATTACK
WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 76, at 154 ("[C]yber operations that directly
result (or are likely to result) in physical harm to individuals or tangible objects equate
to armed force, and are 'therefore uses of force."').
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would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated." 142
Various methods that are available in conventional conflicts to
evaluate whether a planned, ongoing, or completed attack complies
with the proportionality principle are not available to the commander
of a cyber operation. One fundamental problem is that cyberspace
cannot be occupied in the same way that physical terrain can be
controlled. This means that there is no guaranteed point, position, or
space that can be occupied in such a way as to allow an attacker to
observe and evaluate the effects of an attack-even after the attack
has been launched.143 Many types of information about a target may
thus be less accessible to the commander of a cyber, as opposed to a
conventional, military operation.
In both conventional and cyber military operations, a
commander who is planning an attack and attempting to take "all
feasible precautions" to minimize harm to the civilian population is
not assumed to have access to perfect information. Instead, as
explained by the ICTY, "In determining whether an attack was
proportionate it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-
informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator,
making reasonable use of the information available to him or her,
could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the
attack."144
Although cyberspace is a domain of information, the
"information available" to a reasonable commander who is planning
an attack in cyberspace may ironically be extraordinarily limited.
Commanders responsible for military cyber operations must deal with
many challenges in observing the proportionality principle, including
complex barriers that may prevent observation of the different levels
of information that surround targets.145 These barriers may impede
efforts to evaluate the military value of targets while also obscuring
connected and threatened civilian objects that are not the target of
attacks, particularly when networks have both military and civilian
functions.146
142. Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 57.
143. In addition, it has been noted that "information about the effects of
information warfare, besides being intrinsically hard to obtain, is itself subject to
information warfare." LIBIcKI, supra note 110, at 87.
144. Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 1 58 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
145. See LIBICKI, supra note 110, at 94 (noting how "[cihanging the architecture
of the system can also throw off a determined [cyber] attacker. Networks can be
rewired, routers might be added, internal addressing altered, and new internal
barriers created to interfere with the attacker's ability to be certain the right target
was attacked.... Firewalls and other filters may be present.").
146. See LIBICKI, supra note 78, at 153 (noting that "it may not always be
obvious when a civilian target is being hurt. It is possible to know which military
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Yet a commander remains under an obligation, to the extent
feasible, to gather and evaluate information about potential targets to
ensure compliance with IHL targeting rules. At a minimum, this
involves a "continuing obligation to assign a high priority to the
collection, collation, evaluation, and dissemination of timely target
intelligence." 47
Fundamental challenges, however, confront these efforts in
cyberspace. Determining how to access an adversary's systems or
networks to reach a specific target generally requires careful
planning and substantial preparations. 148 Efforts to collect
intelligence about those targets will also generally require
penetrating enemy systems or networks to obtain information prior to
the attack.149
However, an unauthorized entry into an adversary's computer
systems for purposes of gathering intelligence may be viewed, if
detected, as the attack itself. This dilemma highlights a problematic
dimension of information when it is used to penetrate systems as a
reconnaissance tool: the difficulty in characterizing the intent behind
the intrusion.1 50 Efforts to undertake precautionary measures that
involve intrusions into enemy networks could thus, in the worst case
scenario, prompt a counterattack by the enemy.
Even if an intrusion for purposes of gathering intelligence about
a particular target is not viewed by an adversary as an attack, its
detection could seriously threaten a commander's mission. Since such
an intrusion may rely on the same methodologies and information to
functions a network supports without knowing what civilian services the same network
supplies.").
147. BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 116, at 363.
148. See LIBICKI, supra note 78, at 155 ("Cyberwarfare qua warfare is soaked in
intelligence.. .. The search for vulnerabilities is usually a search for specific
vulnerabilities in specific systems that can be exploited in specific ways. Intelligence is
also needed on network architecture, the relationships between various defense
systems . . . and influence relationships (what information affects which types of
decisions?)"); Thomas Rid, What Would a Real Cyberwar Look Like?, NEW SCIENTIST
(Sept. 15, 2013), available at http://www.slate.com/articles/health-andscience/new_
scientist/2013/09/cyberwar.andcyberattacks it_s-really.espionage-subversionor_sab
otage.html ("[T]he number of violent computer-sabotage attacks against Western
targets is zero. Why? Because causing havoc through weaponized code is harder than it
looks. Target intelligence is needed.').
149. See CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31787, INFORMATION
OPERATIONs, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND CYBERWAR: CAPABILITIES AND RELATED
POLICY ISSUES 5 (Sept. 14, 2006) ("Before a crisis develops, DOD seeks to prepare the
10 [information operations] battlespace through intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, and through extensive planning activities. This involves intelligence
collection, that, in the case of 10, is usually performed through network tools that
penetrate adversary systems to gain information about system vulnerabilities, or to
make unauthorized copies of important files.").
150. See Jensen, supra note 86, at 235 (arguing that identifying the intent of the
attacker is potentially more important because the state must "identify the attacker's
intentions as hostile before it may respond with force in kind").
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be used in a planned attack, its detection could risk compromising the
means by which the attack is to be conducted-effectively shutting
the "door" that had been opened into the enemy's networks or
systems.151
A commander may thus face a serious dilemma if the
requirement to take all feasible precautions is interpreted as
requiring preliminary intrusions into an enemy's systems or
networks. To the extent that feasibility relates to making an
"informed decision" in this context, it will focus on what cyber
intelligence-gathering operations must or can be conducted in order
to make that informed decision. 152 However, a commander who
undertakes an extensive intelligence-gathering operation as a
precautionary measure may risk jeopardizing the planned mission by
revealing methods or prompting countermeasures by an adversary
who misinterprets the probe as the attack itself.
The contextual term "feasible" thus seems unlikely to require a
commander to compromise his or her mission by penetrating an
adversary's systems or networks as a precautionary measure. Given
the lack of state practice, the contours of these rules in cyberspace are
not yet clearly defined. Ostensible rules in cyberspace that defy
compliance by reasonable commanders may be, however, just another
kind of legal phantom.
More broadly, a commander seeking to comply with IHL
obligations confronts formidable technical obstacles in precisely
predicting the effects of hostile cyber actions. Because information is
so inherently difficult to control, confine, and segregate in cyberspace,
these obstacles exist even if the commander is equipped with the best
intelligence available. 153 A variety of factors contribute to these
obstacles and challenges. Unlike conflict in physical domains, conflict
in cyberspace is not predictably constrained by physical laws such as
those found in physics or chemistry; complex and rapidly changing
operating systems can create conditions in which the same set of
stimuli may not yield identical or even similar results, and
cyberspace is a medium that can be quickly changed (by defenders or
151. See LIBICKI, supra note 110, at 35, 91 (noting how "[d]eep reconnaissance
may trigger echoes that reveal holes to systems administrators, who can then plug
them and thus change the vulnerability of the target;" moreover, since most computer
network penetrations involve some sort of deception, such penetrations "can therefore
be frustrated to the extent that deception can be unmasked").
152. See Eric Jensen, Unexpected Consequences from Knock-on Effects: A
Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, AM. U. INT'L L. REV 1145, 1184
(2003) (arguing that "feasibility" in cyber attacks "is really about what computer
operations can legitimately be conducted to learn the intelligence needed to make an
informed decision").
153. See LIBICKI, supra note 110, at 93 ("Yet, not even the best intelligence on
opposing systems can provide perfect predictability of the consequences of an attack in
cyberspace.").
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by third parties). 154 Furthermore, various faults, holes,
vulnerabilities, barriers, or anomalies in a particular system may be
unknown to both attackers and defenders until that system actually
confronts new, destructive, and unexpected information programs.
Another factor that may make even the best-planned hostile
cyber act unpredictable is the human element. Humans are the key
cyber players who may-or may not-detect hostile cyber actions,
respond effectively to them, learn from them, make necessary
adjustments to them, and be resistant or vulnerable to their methods
of deception. 155
Difficulties in predicting the consequences of a hostile cyber act
may go far beyond understanding its immediate effects on targeted
systems and networks. Information itself may be uniquely difficult to
confine, particularly in view of the interconnected systems and
networks that carry data in a "wired" modern society and global
economy.156 In this environment, where key networks and systems
are becoming even more complex and interdependent, planners must
grapple with the reality that the information they "launch" into
cyberspace will confront no natural boundaries, may not easily be
confined, and may be amenable to few, if any, certain controls.
The challenges in controlling information in order to limit
damage to civilian objects in cyber operations are compounded by the
other aspects of the nature of targets in cyberspace. It may be
extremely difficult to segregate targeted information and information
systems from those that are not to be targeted. While lines of
communication used by the military are generally regarded as
military objects, which are subject to attack, military communications
rely heavily on the commercial communications infrastructure.1 5 7
The practice of some countries, including the United States, of
broadly defining military objectives-by including objects that make
"an effective contribution to the enemy's war fighting/war sustaining
effort"-further broadens the list of dual-use targets for possible
154. See id. (likening the process to predicting the outcome of a chess game in
which the board and pieces change).
155. See id. at 94 (describing the significant role played by the human element
in information warfare).
156. See Evelyn Iritani & Thomas S. Mulligan, U.S. Economic Slowdown Is
Easing Its Way Around the Globe, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2001), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jan11/news/mn-11033 (referring to the benefits
corporations now enjoy in rapidly transmitting information and making immediate
market-based adjustments in "a global, wired economy").
157. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the H. Comm. on Armed
Serus., 112th Cong. (Mar. 16, 2011) (statement of Gen. Keith B. Alexander,
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command) ("The vast majority of our military's information
packets ride on commercial infrastructure.").
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hostile cyber actions.158 In particular, based on their war-sustaining
capabilities, various economic objects-including banks, stock
exchanges, main export industries, and other key financial and
corporate interests-may represent important targets for cyber
capabilities within the framework of "effects based targeting." 159
Attacking such targets on this basis has, however, been intensely
criticized.160
Nevertheless, cyber capabilities clearly provide new
opportunities to conduct operations to destroy, or temporarily disable,
these and many other objects that may have been previously
inaccessible or impractical to attack with conventional weapons. Such
cyber actions may not only be more effective than attacks with
conventional weapons but will also have the ability to avoid causing
various types of incidental physical damage (from fires, blast damage,
chemical spillage, radiation, etc.) that pose a serious threat to
civilians. 161
In general, cyber capabilities represent important new tools for
military forces to achieve results that were once only obtainable by
conventional weapons. 162 In practical terms, they also add new types
of objects of military value to target lists, including targets linked to
economic resources upon which an adversary relies. These new
targets, however, raise new questions about compliance with the
principle of proportionality and the applicability of the IHL regime
itself.
Regardless of their legal status, hostile cyber acts against targets
of economic importance raise fears about new types of risks. These
158. COMMANDERS HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAvAL OPERATIONS, supra note
115, 5.3.1; U.S. ARMY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL,
OPERATIONAL HANDBOOK ch. 2, § IX.A.2.b.(1) (2012) ("The connection of some objects to
an enemy's war fighting or war-sustaining effort may be direct, indirect, or even
discrete.").
159. See Tony Montgomery, Legal Perspective from the EUCOM Targeting Cell,
78 INT'L L. STUD. 189, 190 (2002) (explaining that "[e]ffects based targeting theorizes
that by attacking specific links, nodes, or objects the effect or combination of effects will
achieve the desired objective").
160. See, e.g., MARCO SASSOu, LEGITIMATE TARGETS OF ATTACKS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 6 (2003), available at http://www.hpcrresearch.org/
sites/default/files/publications/Session1.pdf. But see Ruth G. Wedgwood, Proportionality,
Cyberwar, and the Law of War, 76 INT'L L. STUD. SERIES, U.S. NAVAL WAR. C. 219, 222
(2002) (noting that "[elconomic assets are considered military targets for their support
of the war effort" and, despite criticism, "the legitimacy of weakening an adversary's
industrial base and war production facilities is generally accepted").
161. See Jensen, supra note 18, at 1174 (further noting that CNAs "will be
perceived as a less destructive use of force, in most cases, causing less collateral
damage than kinetic weapons that accomplish the same task. Depending on the target,
it will likely result in fewer injuries and deaths, limited physical destruction, and a
quicker recovery after hostilities cease.").
162. See AIR FORCE, CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS, supra note 4, at ii ("Technological
advances have provided the means to generate decisive and magnified effects in
domains that traditionally could only be achieved via kinetic means.").
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perceived risks include unwanted and disastrous effects on financial
institutions worldwide, said to even inspire a sort of "unwritten
international taboo" against cyber targeting of banking systems.163
Such concerns may, in fact, have played a part in decisions by the
U.S. government to forego possible cyber actions against some
financial targets in several conflicts, including a contemplated action
against the bank accounts of Serbian leader Slobodan Milogevid
during the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and against Iraq's financial system
in 2003.164
While offering significant military advantages, hostile cyber
actions against critical economic targets and other national
infrastructure objectives may also pose serious risks due to the
unpredictable effects of those actions against interdependent systems
(particularly as the interdependence of systems upon which national
infrastructures depend may not even be visible). 165 The possible
extended consequences of a hostile cyber action (whether described as
ripples, reverberations, or "second and third tier effects known as
'knock-on' effects") 166 on information in interconnected
communications, energy, industrial, or financial systems could be far-
reaching and hard if not impossible to reliably predict. 167
Some commentators have suggested that technical solutions are
available to improve the accuracy of cyber weapons and that it is
possible to design highly discriminating and accurate cyber
weapons.1 68 However, as noted above, systemic challenges confront
163. See Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Officials had Weighed Cyberattack on
Gaddafi's Air Defenses, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2011, at A5 (discussing the context of the
George W. Bush administration's consideration of taking cyber actions against Iraq in
2003 to dismantle the Iraqi financial system).
164. See id. (quoting a former Bush Administration official as saying that a
planned cyber action to dismantle Iraq's financial system before the U.S. invasion was
"blocked over concerns about collateral damage that might affect systems beyond the
target").
165. See Richard G. Little, Controlling Cascading Failure: Understanding the
Vulnerabilities of Interconnected Infrastructures, 9 J. URB. TECH. 109, 111 (2002)
("Mitigating damage to infrastructure and ensuring continuity of service is complicated
by the interdependent nature of these systems. For example, although the
interdependence of many systems is straightforward (e.g., the role played by electric
power in providing other services is obvious), the interdependencies of other systems
are no less real if not as visible.").
166. See Jensen, supra note 18, at 1149 (discussing suggestions for new
international agreements that would accommodate the "unique aspects of CNA").
167. See Little, supra note 165, at 112 ("The potential for failures in one
infrastructure system to cause disruptions in others that could ultimately cascade to
still other systems with unanticipated consequences is very real. In truth, beyond a
certain rudimentary level, the linkages between infrastructures, their
interdependencies, and possible failure mechanisms are not well understood.");
LIBICKI, supra note 110, at 259 (noting that "the more the world's economy becomes
globalized, the harder it is to predict ripples from any one act of mischief').
168. See, e.g., Forrest B. Hare, Five Myths of Cyberspace and Cyberpower,
SIGNAL MAG., June 2007, at 90 (arguing that it is a myth that the effects of
"cyberweapons are difficult to control").
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efforts to ensure that harmful information will be effectively
controlled or confined once it is used against complex, sensitive
targets-particularly in view of unknown interconnected systems,
anomalies and changes in those systems, unforeseen technical
complications, and unpredictable human involvement.
Unpredictable human involvement includes the possibility that
cyber actions will be misinterpreted and that responses to those
actions will quickly and dangerously escalate. The "unique
characteristics of cyberspace" (which include problems related to
determining the intent behind cyber actions, anonymity, vast
numbers of actors with malicious cyber tools, and the "the speed of
action and dynamism inherent in cyberspace") may collectively make
this danger of escalation across interconnected systems "especially
acute."1 69
The DoD argues that "dangerous escalatory situations" can be
prevented "by following the same policy principles and legal regimes
in its cyberspace operations that govern actions in the physical world,
including the law of armed conflict." 170 Because of the unique
properties of information, however, this reliance on the law of armed
conflict to successfully govern and control hostile cyber actions (based
on perceived similarities with laws governing conventional weapons
in physical domains) may be seriously overstated or misplaced.
The IHL obligations governing those who plan or decide upon
attacks do not appear to include responsibility for all the possible, or
even foreseeable, consequences of cyber attacks. Instead, based on the
language found in Protocol I, the obligations appear to include only
those effects that can be described as expected.1 71 In particular, the
language setting forth the scope of precautionary measures to ensure
observance of distinction and proportionality requires those who plan
or decide upon an attack to "refrain from deciding to launch any
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life."' 72
This legal standard confining the scope of precautionary
measures means that the effects of many military operations in
169. DOD CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
170. Id. at 5, 8 (further noting that in spite of the challenges posed by the
interconnected nature of cyberspace, "[tihe law of armed conflict and customary
international law ... provide a strong basis to apply [legal frameworks developed for
specific physical domains] to cyberspace governing responsible state behavior").
171. Eric Jensen noted that
[t]he international law standard for CNO is that a commander may use CNA if
he, in good faith, believes that the damage to civilian objects and injury to
civilians expected from the attack, given the circumstances as known to him at
the time after taking all feasible measures to ascertain those circumstances, is
not excessive to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
See Jensen, supra note 18, at 1187.
172. Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 57.2(a)(iii) (emphasis added).
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cyberspace may simply remain outside the realm of the IHL
framework-as legal phantoms in an unchartered area of serious and
complex policy concerns. Nonetheless, concerns about collateral
damage appear to be an important factor in continuing to restrain
many cyber operations.1 7 3 Even if the IHL regime is inapplicable,
decision makers reasonably may be hesitant to approve hostile cyber
acts with potentially far-reaching and unpredictable effects on
information linked to diverse industrial facilities, communication
centers, transportation hubs, commercial activities, financial
institutions, and other unidentified organizations and activities
around the world.
Beyond concerns that are arguably shaded to some degree by
legal questions, various other fears appear to have limited the use of
many cyber weapons by states.174 One set of such extralegal fears has
been the political and strategic consequences of being the first major
power to launch a cyber attack, including the possibility that such an
action will legitimize this new means of warfare.1 7 5
Other extralegal concerns that have apparently limited the use
of cyber weapons relate directly to the peculiar status of information
as a weapon, further illuminating yet another important aspect of its
"uncontrollability." Unlike the payload of physical weapons that is
destroyed or damaged in attacks, the information making up a cyber
weapon generally remains intact after its use, allowing any adversary
with the necessary knowledge and ability to reprogram that malware
for its own use (making it, as noted, an "open source" weapon).
This phenomenon, along with the knowledge that use will ensure
obsolescence, appears to be important in continuing to limit the use of
some new cyber capabilities. Thus, in situations where national
interest is not clearly at risk, a sophisticated cyber weapon has
reportedly been likened by U.S. government officials to an expensive
173. See Nakashima, supra note 163, at A5 (reporting that a proposal to use
cyber weapons to interrupt power sources to disrupt Libya's air defenses would have
forced Pentagon officials to confront "accidently infecting other systems reliant on
electricity, such as those in hospitals").
174. Unofficial accounts of U.S. involvement in the development of the Stuxnet
virus hint at the risks states may take if they assume responsibility for hostile cyber
acts. See Mikko Hypponen, A Pandora's Box We Will Regret Opening, N.Y. TIMES (June
5, 2012, 5:34 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/04/do-cyberattacks-
on-iran-make-us-vulnerable- 12/a-pandoras-box-we-will-regret-opening ("The downside
for owning up to cyberattacks is that other governments can now feel free to do the
same .... By launching Stuxnet, American officials opened Pandora's box. They will
most likely end up regretting this decision.").
175. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Weighed Use of Cyberattacks
to Weaken Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/18/world/africa/cyber-warfare-against-libya-was-debated-by-us.html
(describing how U.S. officials reportedly "balked" at approving the use of cyber
weapons to disrupt Libyan air defenses, fearing among other things that "it might set a
precedent for other nations, in particular Russia or China, to carry out such offensives
of their own").
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car that is best left in the garage.176 A final concern is also presented
by the possibility that the use of a sophisticated cyber weapon will
provide a clear indication of what might otherwise have been the
secret capabilities of the attacker.177
Government, military, and intelligence officials must thus
grapple with numerous risks as they weigh the strategic, security,
and policy implications of using cyber weapons. These concerns,
complicated and magnified by the unpredictability of cyber weapons
and the inherent difficulty in controlling information, serve to
constrain cyber operations. Although legal uncertainties about
incidental damages may cloud assessments of many cyber actions,
important policy issues also surround almost every aspect of their
possible employment. In many cases, the IHL regime will simply not
apply to hostile cyber actions, and even if it does, it is unlikely to
apply to all of their effects. It has thus been suggested that while
cyber activities present various legal challenges, "many problems
masquerading as 'legal' issues are really undecided policy issues with
a number of legal alternatives."i7 8
III. INFORMATION AS A TARGET: THE PROBLEM OF EXPLOITATION
AND CHALLENGES TO CONSEQUENCE-BASED
LEGAL THRESHOLDS
A. Exploitation: A Harmful-But Problematic-Act
While legal concerns related to the observance of key IHL rules
and principles, such as proportionality, distinction, and precautionary
measures, in an attack are important, they are dependent on the
larger threshold IHL problems presented by the use of information as
a weapon and target. As noted, hostile uses of information can give
rise to challenging, fundamental questions regarding the applicability
of IHL itself. No actions highlight these questions more clearly than
176. See id. (quoting an unnamed U.S. official involved in the Libyan discussion
as saying that "[tihese cybercapabilities are still like the Ferrari that you keep in the
garage and only take out for the big race and not just for a run around town, unless
nothing else can get you there").
177. See Nakashima, supra note 163, at A5 ("In general, the U.S. government
has been cautious in its deliberations over the use of cyberweapons, recognizing that
using them can reveal capabilities and set precedents that might encourage other
nations.").
178. Dunlap, supra note 109, at 90, 94 (further noting that in determining the
incidental losses associated with cyber actions, "[a]ssessing second- and third-order
'reverberating' effects may be a wise policy consideration, but it does not appear LOAC
currently requires such further analysis").
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those encompassed within the concept of information
"exploitation." 7 9
The threshold question of whether the IHL regime applies to
particular events in cyberspace is greatly complicated, if not
dominated, by the nature of information itself and the problems
presented by its content. Unlike other types of "targets" that may be
attacked, information may have an intrinsic value that can be stolen
or replicated through cyber methodologies and techniques. For this
reason, the unauthorized exploitation of information by both state
and nonstate actors is currently the most common and highly
damaging type of unfriendly cyber action around the world.18 0
It has long been obvious that criminals can profit from exploiting
valuable information that they access in computer systems and
networks and that these illegal cyber activities have been
extraordinarily costly for individuals and businesses. 181 Yet early
fears expressed by U.S. officials about protecting cyberspace from
cyber attacks tended to focus on the disastrous physical consequences
of hypothetical, catastrophic cyber actions, while the damage from
hostile cyber actions to this point has instead proven to be
informational.1 8 2
Notwithstanding the obvious damage caused by physical forces,
informational damages may be highly significant. 183 There is no
179. In its broadest sense, the term information exploitation may be defined as
"[t]aking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical,
operational, or strategic purposes." See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, supra note 134, at 170 (defining exploitation). In the
more specific context of cyber operations, the commonly used term "Computer Network
Exploitation" (CNE) refers to "intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the
use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary." Id. at 96.
180. See DOD CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 79, at 4 ("Every year, an
amount of intellectual property larger than that contained in the Library of Congress is
stolen from networks maintained by U.S. businesses, universities, and government
departments and agencies."); Libicki, supra note 27, at 54 ("It is fair to say the CNE
accounts for the great preponderance of computer network operations carried out
among states and similarly serious non-criminal organizations.").
181. See Editorial, Cybersecurity at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2012, at A22
(quoting General Keith Alexander, the chief of the United States Cyber Command and
the director of the National Security Agency, as referring to the loss of industrial
information and intellectual property through cyber espionage as "the greatest transfer
of wealth in history").
182. See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE
44- PRESIDENCY 12 (2008) (noting that advice from a U.S. Presidential Commission in
1998 on the protection of cyberspace "was not so much ignored as misinterpreted - we
expected damage from cyber attacks to be physical (opened floodgates, crashing
airplanes) when it was actually informational").
183. See Josh Rogin, NSA Chief: Cybercrime Constitutes the 'greatest transfer of
wealth in history", FOREIGN POL'Y (July 9, 2012), available at
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/09/nsa-chief_cybercrime-constitutes-th
e-greatest transferof wealth in history ("U.S. companies lose about $250 billion per
year through intellectual property theft, with another $114 billion lost due to cyber
crime, a number that rises to $338 billion when the costs of down time due to crime are
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doubt that the exploitation of information-including military secrets
and other classified information, intellectual property, financial
records, and commercial data-in cyberspace is a growing and serious
threat to both states and businesses.1 8 4
While state-sponsored efforts to access, steal, copy, or otherwise
exploit critical information in an adversary state's computer systems
and networks may constitute a new and important chapter in the
long history of espionage, such acts are unlikely to violate any
obligations under international law.185 Furthermore, under the IHL
framework itself, "information-gathering activities" have long been
explicitly recognized as legitimate actions by military forces. 186
Information can, however, be exploited in ways that cause great
damage to states, even if such exploitation or cyber espionage does
not amount to "war."18 7 The acquisition and misuse of a state's most
highly classified information regarding its deployed forces, military
facilities, planned military operations, strategic policies, weapons
capabilities, personnel records, intelligence activities, and key
defensive vulnerabilities can all result in disastrous tactical and
strategic consequences for that state, including events that may
involve great loss of life and destruction of property.
Devastating consequences alone, however, cannot serve as the
basis for imposition of the IHL framework on such acts. The nature of
the act itself-the exploitation of information-is not the type of
conduct that was intended to be subject to IHL restrictions,
regardless of its highly damaging effects.
The exploitation of information thus serves to illustrate how
analogies drawn between harmful cyber techniques and conventional
weapon systems may be misplaced, particularly to the extent that
they focus primarily on their harmful consequences. For purposes of
the IHL regime, damaging acts of information exploitation-which
taken into account, said [General] Alexander, the director of the National Security
Agency and commander of U.S. Cyber Command, in remarks Monday at the American
Enterprise Institute.").
184. See DoD CYBERSPACE STRATEGY, supra note 79, at 3 ("Foreign cyberspace
operations against U.S. public and private sector systems are increasing in number
and sophistication. DoD networks are probed millions of times every day, and
successful penetrations have led to the loss of thousands of files from U.S. networks
and those of U.S. allies and industry partners.").
185. See Jeffrey H. Smith, State Intelligence Gathering and International Law:
Keynote Address, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 544 (2007) ("[I]t is fair to say that the
practice of states recognizes espionage as a legitimate function of the state, and
therefore it is legal as a matter of customary international law.").
186. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Annex (Regulations), supra note 120, at art. 24 (providing that the "employment
of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country are
considered permissible").
187. See Rid, supra note 3 ("Data breaches are not just a risk, but a real
bleeding wound for the United States, Europe, and other advanced economies. But
espionage is not war, and cyberespionage is not cyberwar.").
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are often described as some form of cyber espionage-are legal
phantoms: examples of varied, sometimes highly damaging,
extralegal actions in cyberspace.
Cyber espionage and other forms of data exploitation are
routinely addressed by states as criminal matters.'8 8 They further
bear little resemblance to conventional methods and means of
warfare, although they may have highly damaging consequences.
This paradox appropriately focuses attention on the legal thresholds
that must be met in order to apply the IHL framework to hostile
cyber acts. As noted, writers who emphasize the importance of
consequences generally view cyber acts of disruption and denial as
inappropriate candidates for the IHL framework because of their
limited or temporary effects. The highly damaging consequences of
acts of cyber exploitation, however, necessarily focus attention on the
legal significance of the underlying acts.
B. Information Exploitation, Legal Thresholds, and
Consequentialist Approaches to the Jus ad Bellum
The unusual characteristics of cyber weapons have, as noted,
given rise to considerable discussion among scholars regarding the
question of whether cyber actions alone could ever qualify as an
armed attack for purposes of the jus ad bellum and the use of armed
force in self-defense under the UN Charter. In spite of the clear focus
in the text of the UN Charter on a specific act (an armed attack) as
the legal basis for a state's right to use force in self-defense, some
scholars and experts have instead emphasized the destructive
consequences of the act.189
This consequentialist or effects-based analysis has been
described as "the leading view" among legal experts in determining
whether a hostile cyber act constitutes an armed attack for purposes
of the jus ad bellum, and, by extension, whether threshold
requirements are also met for the application of the IHL regime. 9 0
188. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2013) (criminalizing actions such as the
obtaining, possessing, transmitting, or receiving of "information relating to the
national defense" with "intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to
the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation").
189. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, 76
INT'L L. STUD. 99, 103 (2002) ("The crux of the matter is not the medium at hand (a
computer server in lieu of, say, an artillery battery), but the violent consequences of the
action taken."); Schmitt, supra note 44, at 588-89 ("A cyber attack standing alone will
comprise an armed attack when the consequence threshold is reached.... So long as a
cyber operation is likely to result in the requisite consequences, it is an armed
attack.").
190. See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 109, at 85 ("The leading view, therefore,
among legal experts focuses on the consequences and calls for an effects-based analysis
of a particular cyber incident to determine whether or not it equates to an 'armed
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Other analytical approaches that equate various hostile cyber acts
with conventional armed attacks, such as the "strict liability
approach" and even some interpretations of the "instrument-based
approach," also draw heavily, if not exclusively, on assessments of the
consequences of cyber acts.' 91
Although the U.S. government has not definitively set forth
criteria for determining the legal status of hostile cyber actions under
the jus ad bellum, a consequentialist approach nonetheless prevails
in much of its analysis.192 Such an approach is also reflected in
reported discussions of responses to cyber acts under the doctrine of
"equivalence."1 93
However, a legal approach that focuses only on the consequences
of cyber acts fails to account for the many ways in which information
can be used to cause great damage to an enemy, even though the
underlying acts clearly remain outside the recognized legal
boundaries of armed conflict and the jus ad bellum. In this regard,
cyber espionage and other increasingly varied, sophisticated, and
damaging forms of cyber exploitation deserve special attention.
As noted above, exploiting the most highly classified military
secrets of an adversary can cause destruction, defeats, and losses of
monumental significance. One need only look at the intelligence
activities of the Allies in World War II to appreciate the importance-
and destructiveness-of intercepting, stealing, and otherwise
exploiting critical information, particularly signals and secret
codes.194 The older, conventional underlying methods of espionage
attack' as understood by Article 51."). See generally TALLINN MANUAL ON THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013).
191. See Graham, supra note 83, at 91-92 (reviewing the effects-based and strict
liability models as well as the effects-oriented interpretations of the "instrument-
based" model). But see Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for
Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1023, 1041 (2007) (noting how "the
classic 'instrumentality' approach argues that [an information operation] does not
qualify as armed force because it lacks the physical characteristics traditionally
associated with military coercion").
192. See, e.g., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, DEP'T OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS (May 1999), reprinted in
THOMAS WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW IN
CYBERSPACE 431, 453 (2000) ("[It seems likely that the international community will
be more interested in the consequences of a computer network attack than its
mechanism.").
193. See Gorman, supra note 7 ("One idea gaining momentum at the Pentagon is
the notion of 'equivalence.' If a cyber attack produces the death, damage, destruction or
high-level disruption that a traditional military attack would cause, then it would be a
candidate for a 'use of force' consideration, which could merit retaliation.").
194. See, e.g., F. W. WINTERBOTHAM, THE ULTRA SECRET 2 (1974) (quoting the
supreme allied commander in World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, as
describing "ULTRA" (wartime signals intelligence obtained by the breaking of high-
level encrypted enemy radio and teleprinter communications) as having been "decisive"
to the Allied victory); LIBICKI, supra note 110, at 28 n.21 ("A venerable uncle of
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and intelligence gathering-which included electronic surveillance,
code-breaking efforts, and various types of covert actions-have been
supplemented and dramatically improved by modern cyber espionage
techniques, sometimes with devastating consequences.195
Damaging acts of espionage and other unfriendly forms of
information exploitation abound in modern international relations,
along with other destructive, nonphysical acts designed to exert
economic or political coercion. Because of the frequency, nature, and
diversity of these unfriendly acts, imposing the jus ad bellum on all of
them would diminish restrictions on the use of force, thereby
significantly weakening key safeguards upon which the international
community relies and undermining the UN Charter's central purpose
of maintaining international peace and security. 196
Such concerns influenced the drafters of the UN Charter as they
grappled with jus ad bellum issues. Although they understood that
many acts in the international arena can cause great harm to states,
they decided that the UN Charter's central prohibition in Article 2(4)
should be against the "threat or use of force."197
While the focus in Article 2(4) is on physical armed force, the
phrase "use of force" is not defined in the UN Charter itself. It is
nonetheless possible to identify some important, widely accepted
parameters of the phrase. For example, efforts by a few states to
explicitly include one important type of destructive, nonphysical
conduct in the Article 2(4) prohibition against force-acts of economic
coercion-were rejected.'9 8
Thus, the consequences of unfriendly acts by states have not
dominated the development of legal frameworks regarding recourse to
force adopted by the international community. Instead, the consensus
computer network exploitation, codemaking and codebreaking, can also be associated
with information warfare.").
195. See Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, supra note 36, at 26 (quoting
James Lewis of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies as referring to cyber
espionage as "the biggest intelligence disaster since the loss of the nuclear secrets [in
the late 1940s]").
196. See Hollis, supra note 191, at 1040 (arguing that the exclusion of economic
and political forms of coercion from the definition of force "reflects an effort to proscribe
those acts most likely to interfere with the U.N.'s primary purpose-maintaining
international peace and security").
197. See U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.").
198. The Brazilian delegation proposed that Article 2(4) include a prohibition
against the use of "economic measures," but this proposal was rejected by states during
the drafting of the UN Charter. See Eleventh Meeting of Comm. I, Doc. 784, Il/ XXVII
U.N.C.I.O. Does. 335 (June 4, 1945) (rejecting the Brazilian delegation's suggested
inclusion of a prohibition against "economic measures"); Amendments to the
Dumbarton Oaks Proposal Presented by the Brazilian Delegation, Doc. 2, 617(e)(4), III
U.N.C.I.O. Does. 251, 253-54 (May 6, 1945).
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that emerged in framing the UN Charter, despite the objections of a
small number of states, was that Article 2(4) should not be extended
to include some important and damaging actions states may employ
against each other, including acts involving destructive economic
coercion.199
Although it is generally accepted that acts of economic coercion-
like other hostile acts not involving physical armed force-lie outside
the scope of Article 2(4), the effects of the most serious economically
coercive measures may still be significant and highly damaging to the
targeted states. Nonetheless, such damaging acts, and many other
"non-military techniques of coercion," are generally classified by the
international community not as illegal uses of force but instead as
violations of the principle of nonintervention. 200
Some proponents of a consequentialist approach to conflict in
cyberspace suggest that the emphasis in Article 2(4) on a particular
prohibited type of instrument-that is, force-is outdated or
misplaced and should instead be viewed as a sort of "cognitive short
hand" for the real issue that states are focused on: "destructive
consequences."201 It is also possible, however, to view the word "force"
as conveying what appears to be its plain meaning in the text:
physical armed force. 202 In this sense, it is a cognitive transcription of
the desire of states to limit the most serious prohibitions and
penalties of the UN Charter to the instrument whose misuse gave
rise to the UN Charter regime in the first place.
The failure by states to include acts of espionage and acts of
political, psychological, or economic coercion within the scope of
Article 2(4) helps illustrate this point. Although these acts are not
regarded as uses of force under the UN Charter, they may cause
enormous damage. In particular, human rights groups and relief
organizations continue to stress the highly damaging effects of
coercive economic actions against civilians in targeted states. For
example, some medical experts have argued that the U.S. embargo
199. See Richard B. Lillich, The Status of Economic Coercion Under
International Law: United Nations Norms, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 17, 19 (1977) ("[There is
little evidence to show that more than a handful of states in the UN ever have
considered, much less now believe, that article 2(4) speaks to economic coercion.").
200. See Derek W. Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1, 1 (1972) ("[I]t is better to confine Article 2(4) to military force, including
possibly the encouragement or incitement of military force, and to leave the issues of
economic aggression or other non-military techniques of coercion to the separate
principle of non-intervention.").
201. See Schmitt, supra note 44, at 573 ("The interpretive dilemma is that the
drafters of the Charter took a cognitive shortcut by framing the treaty's prohibition in
terms of the instrument of coercion employed-force. . . . Yet, it is seldom the
instrument employed, but instead the consequences suffered, that matter to states.").
202. See D. W. BOWET, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1958)
("Taking the words in their plain, common-sense meaning, it is clear that, since the
prohibition is of the 'use or threat of force', they will not apply to economic or political
pressure but only to physical, armed force.").
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against Cuba has "dramatically harmed the overall health and
nutrition of many Cuban citizens." 203 Similarly, according to some
reports, UN economic sanctions on Iraq from 1990 to 2003 had
"devastating effects on the Iraqi population and economy." 2 04
State practice related to economic and other nonmilitary,
coercive measures helps demonstrate several important points. It
establishes that a coercive or unfriendly action by a state that hurts
another country's military forces or civilian population does not, on
that basis alone, make the action a use of force or an act of
aggression. This state practice further illustrates how international
law has long distinguished between traditional uses of armed force
and other types of acts involving the infliction of hardship or
suffering.20 5
In spite of the great damage that may be caused by acts of
economic coercion and by other nonphysical, unfriendly acts, writers
applying a consequentialist approach generally do not regard such
acts-or cyber operations involving them-as constituting a use of
force. 206 This position is not based, however, on the absence of
physical armed force but rather on various factors related to the
effects of the acts. These factors include: severity, immediacy,
directness, invasiveness, measurability, presumptive legitimacy, and
responsibility.207 While these factors may offer some useful insights,
they fail to fully account for the unique properties of the information
used in hostile cyber acts and also disregard the importance that
states continue to attach to the nature of the act causing the harmful
consequences.
The first factor, severity-relating to the scale, scope, and
duration of the consequences-restates a legal requirement that is
routinely applied in evaluating conventional uses of force. For
example, as noted above, the ICJ distinguishes "the most grave forms
203. See, e.g., Javier H. Campos, The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on Health
Care in Cuba: A Clinician's Perspective, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 517, 519
(2004) (citing a study by the American Association for World Health examining the
embargo's negative effects in various health-related areas, including "malnutrition,
water quality, medicines, equipment, and medical information").
204. See LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG, SEYMOUR E. GOODMAN & KEVIN J. Soo Hoo,
INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 19 (1998) (discussing the effects of
the UN embargo against Iraq).
205. See id. at 18 (noting that "[1]ongstanding international practice recognizes
that nations may inflict great hardship upon each other and their respective citizenries
without such infliction constituting the use of force or a violation of international law").
206. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 44, at 574 ("Whatever force is, then, it is not
economic or political pressure. Therefore, a cyber operation that involves such coercion
is definitely not a prohibited use of force.").
207. See id. at 575-77 (discussing factors "likely to influence assessments by
states as to whether particular cyber operations amounted to use of force"); Dunlap,
supra note 109, at 85 (noting that "Schmitt pioneered this [consequentialist] approach
and offers seven factors to consider in making the judgment as to whether a particular
cyber event constitutes 'force' at all").
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of the use of force" from "other less grave forms" in order to determine
the presence of any armed attack for purposes of Article 51.208 The
most severe damages caused by the most serious acts of economic
coercion (and presumably also by other nonmilitary techniques of
coercion) may be grave, but they are not the result of a prohibited use
of force because-according to consequentialist analysis-they fail to
comport with various other factors, such as directness, immediacy,
and measurability.
A consequentialist approach posits that damages caused by
economic actions are unlike those caused by conventional weapons,
such as the damage from an explosion, because of an attenuated and
indirect "causal connection." 209 It may indeed be difficult to determine
the chain of causation for the eventual downturn of an economy based
on the workings of complex market forces and government decision
making in sanctioned countries. Yet the causal connection between
some acts of economic coercion and their effects-such as an embargo
causing the abrupt end of a state's ability to export a dominant
commodity-may not be difficult to establish. At the same time, the
perceived "directness" of many destructive cyber acts may be an
illusion, as discussed in more detail in Part IV.
The temporal aspect of indirect-and thus delayed-
consequences of economic and other nonphysical coercive or hostile
actions gives rise to the so-called immediacy factor. Consequentialists
suggest here that "states harbor a greater concern about immediate
consequences than those that are delayed or build slowly over
time."210 Yet it is not at all clear that states regard delayed damages
caused by physical weapons as any less serious from a legal or policy
perspective than those with immediate consequences. For example,
states have expressed great concern about the terrible damage that
landmines may cause over many years and about the slow but deadly
spread of pathogens linked to the employment of biological
weapons. 211
With respect to measurability, it is suggested that it is more
difficult to identify or quantify harm caused by economic coercion
208. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, IT 191, 195 (June 27); see also Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003
I.C.J. 161, 1 51 (Nov. 6) (strongly reaffirming the distinction made by the I.C.J. in
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua).
209. See Schmitt, supra note 44, at 576 (contrasting causal attributes of
economic and armed actions).
210. Id.
211. Such damages are in fact so serious that the international community has
acted to ban both these weapon systems in international conventions. See Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583,
1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Treaty]; Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 [hereinafter Ottawa Treaty].
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than it is to do so for damage caused by physical weapons. 212 While
this may be true in calculating more complex damages, such as those
presented by economic opportunity costs, the sudden loss of funds in a
country's foreign exchange bank can be immediate, highly damaging,
and directly linked to actions preventing the export of goods. On the
other hand, measuring the precise damages caused by some highly
destructive physical weapon systems, such as those caused by
biological agents, may not be as easy or simple.2 13
The great difficulty in successfully applying various factors to
distinguish the consequences of hostile, nonphysical acts, such as
coercive economic acts, from the effects of conventional, physical
weapons (and attempting, in turn, to use these factors to distinguish
the effects of cyber acts) highlights two critical issues. First, the act-
and not just the consequences-matters. Second, when applied to the
use of information as a weapon and target, some of these factors are
merely signposts of intractable problems confronting attempts to
analogize informational acts in cyberspace with conventional,
physical weapons.
For example, responsibility as a factor takes on far more complex
dimensions in cyberspace than it does in the physical world. As
discussed above, responsibility and attribution problems are
integrally linked to more difficult and fundamental problems
presented by hostile uses of information and the architecture of the
Internet itself. These problems cast long shadows over efforts to
classify hostile uses of information as illegal uses of force.
When information is used as a weapon, invasiveness as a factor
of analysis also highlights much larger, more complex problems
presented by the use of information as a weapon than those presented
by the use of physical weapons on physical terrain. Cyber weapons
and acts of cyber espionage may in fact be highly invasive, yet involve
no physical breach of territorial boundaries.2 14
A final consequentialist factor posits that since various
unfriendly, harmful acts between states-including those involving
propaganda, psychological warfare, or espionage-are clearly not
212. Schmitt, supra note 44, at 576-77.
213. Due to the difficulty of differentiating biological attacks from naturally
occurring epidemics or endemic disease, such attacks have proven to be difficult to
measure or even prove as evidenced by the inability of both the United States and the
Soviet Union to gather convincing evidence to prove or disprove allegations of biological
weapon attacks during the Cold War. See George W. Christopher et al., Biological
Warfare: A Historical Perspective, 278 J. AM. MEDICAL ASS'N 412, 414-16 (1997) (noting
that most of the allegations of biological attacks that have been made since World War
I "have not been confirmed in the absence of compelling microbiological or
epidemiologic data supporting a biological attack").
214. See Schmitt, supra note 44, at 576 (admitting that "[iun the cyber context,
[invasiveness] must be cautiously applied" since cyber exploitation is "highly invasive"
and a "pervasive tool of modern espionage," yet clearly does not constitute a use of
force).
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regulated by international law governing the use of force, to the
extent that such acts are conducted by means of cyber operations,
they are "presumptively legitimate." 215 This argument, however,
involves somewhat circular reasoning, while also skirting the central
issue of what constitutes prohibited armed force. The harmful cyber
acts at issue may be presumptively legitimate precisely because they,
along with other cyber acts, do not involve the harmful, physical acts
that are the focus of the jus ad bellum.
Complex combinations of factors that are said to inform a
consequentialist approach to the jus ad bellum in cyberspace thus
belie a simpler truth (and dilemma): legitimate cyber attacks must
closely resemble not only the effects but also the acts that make up
conventional armed attacks (involving physical armed force).
Notwithstanding their highly damaging consequences, hostile
cyber acts involving unauthorized access to information-and
subsequent acts of exploitation-again bear little resemblance to the
acts involving physical armed force that have long served as the basis
for the jus ad bellum. Instead, they rank among other nonphysical,
coercive, or hostile acts that the international community has
prudently chosen not to classify as state behavior justifying an armed
response. To do otherwise risks undermining the UN Charter regime
and the jus ad bellum itself.
C. Information Exploitation, Legal Thresholds, and
Consequentialist Approaches to the
Jus in Bello
Turning to the jus in bello, varied and complex forms of
information exploitation pose serious challenges to an effects-based
analysis in determining the legal status of hostile cyber actions. As
discussed above, the initial threshold for the application of the IHL
framework is the presence of an armed conflict. Consequentialist
writers suggest that the key factors in finding that hostile cyber
actions standing alone give rise to an armed conflict are essentially
the same as those required for an armed attack for purposes of the jus
ad bellum: destructive consequences (specifically, "measures that
injure, kill, damage or destroy"). 216
Serious physical damages are indeed fundamental to an armed
conflict. But the IHL regime was never intended to apply to every
type of damaging action, including acts of information exploitation
with highly destructive consequences. This is true because, as noted,
the IHL regime speaks to both damaging consequences and
215. Id. at 577.
216. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 76, at 174 ("Applying the approach adopted in
the context of the jus ad bellum, relevant actions must be likely to result in injury,
death, damage or destruction to comprise an international armed conflict.").
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recognized acts, with a central focus on armed violence. In the context
of an ongoing armed conflict, the key threshold question for
application of the IHL framework focuses on a particular act of armed
violence: an attack. For purposes of the IHL framework, Protocol I
defines an attack as an "act of violence against the adversary,
whether in offence or in defence."217
Any decision to apply the IHL framework to a particular hostile
cyber action must thus be based on a careful assessment of the nature
of the action to determine if it qualifies as an attack and an act of
violence. In spite of the explicit focus of the IHL regime on the nature
of the act, writers advancing a consequentialist approach instead
focus on destructive effects. They thus view the term attacks as
merely "prescriptive shorthand" for specific consequences and the
term violence as "useful shorthand" for consequence-based rules
designed to protect the civilian population from harmful effects.2 18
Such an approach problematically assumes that the phrase "act
of violence" is merely explanatory (only in terms of its consequences)
and not a legal requirement with separate components. 2 19 While it is
clear that the core principles of the IHL framework seek to protect
the civilian population from injury, death, damage, and destruction,
the framework was not designed-and cannot be legitimately
extended-to encompass all forms of serious, harmful state conduct in
the cyber age. This is especially true regarding acts of espionage or
information exploitation; such acts are widely recognized as lying
outside the jus ad bellum, and as information-gathering activities
they enjoy explicit protection under the jus in bello.
In light of the central role that physical violence plays in key
IHL obligations and in related state practice, it is unclear why
shorthand or shortcuts around this requirement are needed or
desirable. On the contrary, such shorthand risks dangerously
overextending the IHL framework to encompass cyber actions that it
should not, particularly those involving complex and varied forms of
information exploitation.
Writers applying effects-based analysis conclude that acts of
cyber espionage should be excluded from the IHL framework because
the "foreseeable consequences" of these acts generally "would not
217. Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 49 (emphasis added).
218. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 129, at 377 ("Attacks' is a term of prescriptive
shorthand intended to address specific consequences."); Schmitt, supra note 123, at 93
(noting that the primary purpose of the Additional Protocol was the protection of
civilian populations and that '[v]iolence' merely constituted useful prescriptive
shorthand for use in rules designed to shield the population from harmful effects").
219. See Schmitt, supra note 129, at 377 ("To the extent that the term 'violence'
is explicative, it must be considered in the sense of violent consequences rather than
violent acts.").
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include injury, death, damage or destruction." 220 Yet, diverse and
complex types of information exploitation tools now challenge the
simplistic classification of many hostile cyber actions and may even
cause identical results.
Cyber techniques designed to exploit information may closely
resemble many other types of hostile cyber acts and may in fact be
difficult to distinguish in key respects. 221 Like other hostile cyber
acts, information exploitation first requires an unauthorized
intrusion into an adversary's systems or networks and may also
require the clandestine placement there of malignant computer
programs (for purposes of collecting and then transmitting
information necessary for further hostile actions).
When hidden malware programs in an adversary's computer
systems or networks exploit data by taking or removing it (and not by
simply copying it), the damaging effects may be the same as those
caused by other cyber acts stylized as destructive cyber attacks.
When data is exploited because of its valuable content (particularly
financial, intellectual, and proprietary information, as discussed in
Part IV), even more difficult questions are raised in distinguishing
cyber acts of exploitation and destruction.
If, in fact, the "taking" of information through its exploitation
causes damage by reason of the loss of the value of that information,
it becomes almost impossible to distinguish the destruction of that
information in a cyber attack from an act of cyber espionage. There
also remains the intractable problem of defining precisely what
constitutes the "valuable content" of information for purposes of
defining an attack and whether such data can or should serve as an
object of an attack.
Content definition issues are, however, only one serious
challenge to consequentialist attempts to distinguish acts of cyber
exploitation from so-called cyber attacks. The status of this former set
of cyber acts is also greatly complicated by the central and growing
role that information exploitation (or exfiltration) plays in a wide
variety of destructive hostile cyber actions. The destructive elements
of the most sophisticated "offensive cyberweapons" may in fact be
220. See id. at 374 ("[H]umanitarian law would not pertain to disrupting a
university intranet, downloading financial records, shutting down Internet access
temporarily or conducting cyber espionage, because, even if part of a regular campaign
of similar acts, the foreseeable consequences would not include injury, death, damage
or destruction.").
221. See LIBICKI, supra note 110, at 28-29 (noting that "computer network
attack and exploitation are close cousins. Both use similar tricks to get into
information systems, and therefore call on similar skills. Both subvert control systems.
But their intent in different").
[VOL. 4767
LEGAL PHANTOMS IN CYBERSPACE
intertwined with necessary layers of "reconnaissance and espionage
software," which collectively make up the "attacking software." 222
Cyber exploitation software may thus be indistinguishable from
the destructive malware itself and the operational parameters may be
similar as well-the only difference being the "payload" that is to be
executed.2 23 It is also possible that individual malware payloads may
simultaneously have "multiple functions," one designed to exfiltrate
data and the other to destroy or manipulate it, depending on which
commands are received or how the malware is otherwise
controlled. 224
Many complex cyber weapons may depend on the successful
exfiltration of data in order to cause intended damage. As reportedly
demonstrated by the Stuxnet worm, manipulating data in complex
computer systems at highly secure, secret facilities is likely to require
extensive reconnaissance activities and planning-making the data
exploitation process essentially the first part of the strike itself.225
Cyber tools designed for exploitation purposes continue to
become more complex, sophisticated, and damaging. These
developments are demonstrated by the "Flame Virus," which has
been described by government officials as a "massive piece of
malware" that "secretly mapped and monitored Iran's computer
networks, sending back a steady stream of intelligence to prepare for
a cyberwarfare campaign." 226 The Flame Virus is said to further
illustrate the importance of "mapping networks and collecting
intelligence on targets as the prelude to an attack, especially in closed
computer networks." 227 While the Flame Virus may be both a
powerful and unprecedented tool of cyber espionage as well as the
first part of a larger hostile cyber act, it may also be able to perform
222. Randall R. Dipert, The Ethics of Cyberwarfare, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 384, 391
(2010).
223. See TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION
AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 81 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam &
Herbert S. Lin eds., 2009) (distinguishing cyber exploitations from cyber attacks).
224. See id. at 151-52 (discussing the capability for multiple simultaneous
functions by individual payloads and the role of command and control arrangements in
determining payload functions).
225. See David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against
Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at Al (reporting that part of the Stuxnet worm
apparently mapped operations and created the equivalent of "an electrical blueprint of
the Natanz plant," since efforts to seize control of the Iranian centrifuges would fail
unless "every circuit was understood").
226. See Ellen Nakashima, Greg Miller & Julie Tate, U.S., Israel Developed
Flame Computer Virus to Slow Iranian Nuclear Efforts, Officials Say, WASH. POST
(June 19, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-19/world/35460741-1
stuxnet-computer-virus-malware.
227. Id.
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multiple other functions, including "wiping out a computer's hard
drive."2 28
The precise nature of a hostile cyber action may thus defy easy
categorization. For this reason, treating cyber acts that are designed
to exploit information as fundamentally different from cyber acts that
are designed to disrupt, destroy, or manipulate information (with
resulting physical damage) may be difficult and inappropriate.
While the features of conventional weapon systems are physical
and their use can be compared on the basis of both physical attributes
and effects, the features of cyber weapons are informational and are
thus harder to characterize, quantify, and distinguish from each
other. This compounds the danger of imposing the IHL framework on
diverse acts in cyberspace based on artificial, simplistic, or
technologically ill-founded distinctions.
IV. INFORMATION AS A TARGET: PROBLEMS OF MANIPULATION
AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTENT AND USERS
Many cyber attack scenarios depict relatively simplistic efforts
by states to manipulate data in cyberspace in such a way that a few
mouse clicks or a few strokes on a keyboard directly and immediately
cause catastrophic damage to various physical structures of an
adversary (such as power plants, transportation hubs, dams, etc.).2 29
If the resulting damages are sufficiently severe, a writer applying a
purely consequentialist approach is likely to conclude that the IHL
framework applies to such destructive hypothetical cyber actions.
This simplistic cause-and-effect analysis is likely, however, to
overlook critical issues associated with the content of information, the
different layers of cyberspace, and the different users of information
(particularly humans) in cyberspace.
A. Information Manipulation or Exploitation? The Problem
of Content and Economic Targets
A nation's critical infrastructure includes vital economic
components, including key commercial facilities, critical
manufacturing sectors, and the banking and finance sectors.2 30 As
228. Nicole Perlroth, Researchers Find Clues in Malware, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,
2012, at B1.
229. See Cyber-Warfare: Hype and Fear, THE EcONOMIST (Dec. 8, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21567886-america-leading-way-
developing-doctrines-cyber-warfare -other-countries- may (noting that, regardless of
overstated vulnerabilities to cyber attack, "[t]he nightmares are of mouseclicks
exploding fuel refineries, frying power grids or blinding air-traffic controllers").
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2006) (defining critical infrastructure as "systems
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the
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discussed above, attacks with conventional weapons on critical
infrastructure, particularly economic targets, have generated
considerable controversy in recent years and have sharpened the
debate among governments, scholars, and nongovernmental
organizations about what constitutes a legitimate military objective
for targeting purposes under the IHL framework.
Concerns about using conventional weapons to attack economic
targets are greatly increased by fears about compliance with the
principle of proportionality. The dual-use nature of most economic
targets and the civilian facilities and personnel that are likely to
surround them may often mean that attacks on such targets with
conventional weapons will present a high risk of excessive damage to
the civilian population.
There may also be serious, practical, and nonlegal concerns
related to using conventional weapons to attack financial institutions.
Although dropping a bomb on a bank, stock exchange, or other
financial institution may damage physical structures, it may have
little effect on accounts and many other financial assets. Similarly,
bombs dropped on individual physical targets may be ineffective in
disrupting larger financial networks.
On the other hand, a hostile cyber act against information in
financial institutions or networks themselves could achieve the
previously elusive goals of destroying, or removing, key financial
assets or disrupting critical financial networks. As noted, military
planners may assign a high priority to destroying or disrupting key
economic targets of an adversary and will continue to consider the
advantages of using cyber capabilities against economic targets in
future conflicts. New cyber espionage tools that can help to identify,
penetrate, and survey the most lucrative economic targets will
increase the likelihood that these targets will be attacked.
Notwithstanding the advantages that cyber capabilities may
offer over conventional weapons when used against economic targets,
their use against banks and other financial institutions remains
controversial. As suggested by one senior U.S. military leader, "[Ilt is
difficult for me to conceive of an instance where it would be
appropriate to attack a bank or a financial institution, unless perhaps
it was being used solely to support enemy military operations."2 3 1
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters"); see also Financial Services Sector: Sector Overview,
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEc., http://www.dhs.gov/financial-services-sector (last
visited Dec. 15, 2013) (stating that "[t]he Financial Services Sector represents a vital
component of our nation's critical infrastructure").
231. See Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, Nominee
for Commander, U.S. Cyber Command: Before the S. Armed Services Comm., 111th
Cong. 13 (Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://epic.org/Alexander_04-15-1O.pdf
(statements of Lieutenant General Keith Alexander).
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There may be a variety of concerns related to the use of cyber
capabilities against financial institutions, including the possibility of
far-reaching, unwanted repercussions. 232 Yet many of these concerns
are based more on practical, political, or economic factors than they
are on legal considerations. In this regard, planners may fail to
consider the possibility that some economic targets have both military
and civilian uses and may thus legitimately be subject to attack
under the IHL framework.2 33
As cybercrime statistics reflect, hostile cyber actions against
businesses and financial institutions routinely involve the
exploitation of valuable information. 234 When intellectual property,
proprietary information, bank and credit card account information,
other diverse forms of financial information, or various financial
assets in a digitalized form are removed or otherwise made
inaccessible by a hostile cyber act, consequences alone cannot be the
appropriate lens of analysis for IHL purposes.
The very nature of a hostile cyber act against an economic target
makes it far more likely that the act will constitute an economic,
property, or security crime under a state's domestic law than an act of
violence governed by the IHL regime or an armed attack for purposes
of the jus ad bellum.2 35 Hostile, state-sponsored cyber acts against
economic targets may in fact be indistinguishable from increasingly
common acts of cyber fraud, larceny, or espionage. Even the
characterization of the cyber act itself is problematic, since the
exploitation of valuable data (through its theft and removal) may be
impossible to meaningfully distinguish from the manipulation or
destruction of that data.
Extending the IHL regime to encompass diverse acts of
information exploitation, which are typically treated as criminal acts
under the domestic laws of states, raises serious concerns about
expanding the scope of modern armed conflicts into the already
crowded domains of conventional criminal activities and cybercrime.
It further risks undermining the viability of the IHL regime itself by
transforming a multitude of economic crimes into attacks and acts of
violence.
Serious questions are raised by any approach that, by focusing
exclusively on economic damages, equates cyber acts involving the
removal of valuable financial data with attacks under the IHL regime
232. See supra text accompanying notes 163, 165-67 (regarding the "unwritten
international taboo" against cyber targeting of banking systems).
233. See Dunlap, supra note 109, at 89-90 (observing in this regard that "cyber
strategists need to distinguish prudent targeting from legal mandates").
234. See, e.g., Rogin, supra note 183 (noting that "U.S. companies lose about
$250 billion per year through intellectual property theft" alone).
235. As discussed above, this point is consistent with state practice, which
continues to reject the application of the cyberwar model to numerous, diverse, and
hostile cyber actions that occur on a daily basis against economic targets worldwide.
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(or armed attacks for the jus ad bellum). While economic damages
may result from conventional, physical attacks, purely financial
losses linked to a hostile cyber act are a poor substitute for the
human suffering caused by acts of violence under the jus in bello.
Such losses by themselves are in fact far removed from the violent
deaths, injuries, and destruction that gave rise to the IHL regime
itself.
Nonetheless, since financial harm represents a form of injury,
some writers applying a consequentialist approach (thus interpreting
or explaining the term violence as relating primarily to effects and
not to acts of physical force) conclude that a hostile cyber act that
causes serious economic damage, including the loss of stocks and the
loss of money in bank accounts, may qualify as an act of violence for
purposes of the IHL framework. 236 However, ignoring the nature of
the underlying cyber act here is highly problematic.
Financial damages caused by hostile cyber acts may indeed be
significant. Yet they are identical to the monetary losses associated
with diminished bank accounts, 401k plans, stock portfolios,
corporate assets, and other financial interests caused by a wide
variety of actions, including many common, unfriendly actions taken
by states far removed from armed conflict. Governments take money
from private and foreign-owned entities through all manners of fiscal,
regulatory, and administrative mechanisms. They can do this
directly, by debiting accounts, freezing access to funds, seizing
financial assets, and taking other actions executed through electronic
transfers or other digital means. Many of these actions, if taken
against foreign interests without their authorization, may be difficult
to distinguish from various hostile cyber acts against the same
economic targets.
A conclusive characterization of the effects of cyber actions
against many economic targets is further clouded by the fundamental
problem of what constitutes the "content" of information, especially
when financial and proprietary interests can themselves be
transmitted and stored as sets of data. Some advocates of a
consequentialist approach suggest that the "permanent loss of assets"
(such as money or stock) constitutes damage or destruction for
purposes of the jus in bello if those assets are "directly transferable
into tangible property." 237 Similarly, for purposes of the jus ad
bellum, these consequentialists argue that the "destruction of data
[which is] designed to be immediately convertible into tangible
236. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 129, at 377 (noting that "[t]o the extent that
the term 'violence' is explicative, it must be considered in the sense of violent
consequences rather than violent acts. Significant human physical or mental suffering
is logically included in the concept of injury; permanent loss of assets, for instance
money, stock, etc., directly transferable into tangible property likewise constitutes
damage or destruction.").
237. Id.
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objects, like banking data, could also be reasonably encompassed
within the scope of 'armed attacks."' 238 Taking this a step even
further, these writers suggest that while characterizing data as an
object of attack may be problematic, it is nonetheless appropriate if
the data has "intrinsic value."2 3 9
The idea that phases or formulas will be found that clearly
define the status of diverse types of financial and other valuable data
for purposes of establishing "damages" in armed conflict is an illusory
one and presents intractable questions. When exactly is valuable data
"immediately transferrable" into tangible property? Are not stolen
passcodes, encrypted data for accessing financial accounts, and other
types of security information immediately transferrable into a
tangible financial gain once they are used against economic targets?
Are not personal credit card information and other data in financial
records (that can be immediately used for illicit, profitable purposes)
a type of data that is immediately transferrable into tangible objects?
Are these and other acts that result in monetary losses, such as the
cyber theft of intellectual property, proprietary information, and
other varied, digitalized "assets," the type of damage that constitutes
an act of violence or armed attack? Do not all of these forms of
information arguably have intrinsic value?
The questions of when data is immediately transferable into
tangible property, when data has sufficient transferable value to be
declared a financial asset, and when data has intrinsic value may
have as many answers as there are different types of valuable
information. Yet these questions must be answered definitively in
order to determine the applicability of the IHL regime if a
consequentialist legal standard is applied that centers exclusively on
the nature of the economic damages. Suggesting that the IHL
framework applies to hostile cyber acts on this basis does not,
however, involve a workable standard. The content of information,
with its infinite permutations, defies facile delimitations, particularly
as more and more types of valuable "property" and financial interests
are being placed in a digitalized format.
Somewhat similar issues greatly complicate the application of
the jus ad bellum to hostile cyber acts in this area. The ability of the
UN Charter regime to limit the use of force would be significantly
weakened if the presence of an armed attack was made to depend on
defining monetary losses associated with the exploited content of
targeted data, establishing the exploited content's intrinsic value, or
238. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 44, at 589 (noting, however, that "the
destruction of or damage to data, standing alone, would not rise to the level of an
armed attack").
239. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 123, at 96 (suggesting that "it is perhaps best
to treat lightly in characterizing data as an object" while noting that "some data [has]
intrinsic value," for example, "digital art").
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answering related questions regarding the convertibility of financial
information. Furthermore, to the extent that cyber acts against
economic targets undermine financial markets or result in
widespread economic dislocation or hardship, challenges are
presented in distinguishing such acts from other types of unfriendly
or coercive economic actions that are not viewed as illegal uses of
force in the international arena.
Acts involving the unauthorized use, removal, or other
exploitation of valuable data clearly represent some of the most
common types of criminal activity now plaguing cyberspace.
Distinguishing such common crimes from identical acts of state-
sponsored hostile cyber acts may be logically difficult, unworkable in
terms of legal standards, and technically impossible in light of the
anonymity that characterizes information in cyberspace and the
architecture of the Internet. The replication or removal of valuable
economic information and other forms of cyber espionage and
exploitation in this area thus continue to properly remain outside
both the IHL framework and the jus ad bellum.
B. Manipulating Information, Layers of Cyberspace, and
Users of Information
Articles in popular media describing hypothetical cyber
attacks-in which catastrophic damages are caused by the
manipulation, corruption, or destruction of data-often contain
images of sinister fingers touching computer keyboards, along with
pictures of explosions at oil refineries, nuclear plants, and other
facilities. 240 The apparent simplicity and the direct, immediate
impact of such cyber acts may be deceiving and highly unrealistic. In
fact, the link between a hostile cyber action and the "resulting"
damages requires a careful assessment of the targeted information
(upon which targeted systems, facilities, or activities depend), its
content, its users, and its location in the layers of cyberspace.
Most definitions of cyberspace focus on its technical
characteristics. For example, the U.S. military defines it as a "global
domain within the information environment consisting of the
interdependent network of information technology
infrastructures . . . including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers." 241 However, for purposes of targeting, it may be more
240. For example, the cover of the July 2010 issue of the Economist magazine
featured a pixelated mushroom cloud spreading over a city with the caption:
"Cyberwar: The threat from the internet." See Cover to 396 THE EcONOMIST, no. 8689,
July 3, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/16481504.
241. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED
TERMS, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, at 64 (amended through Nov. 2013) (defining
cyberspace). For a similar definition that focuses on technical characteristics, see Cyber
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useful to look at cyberspace as not only possessing various technical
characteristics but also as being composed of three separate layers: a
"physical layer" (including the computers, wires, routers, and other
physical infrastructure assets); a "syntactic layer" (information,
programs, or networks that control information systems); and a
"semantic layer" (information that is "meaningful to humans").242
This layered approach to cyberspace has profound implications
for targeting. First, it means that attacking one layer of cyberspace
does not ensure penetration or control of other levels. Second, it
highlights the critical difference between the users of information-
that is, information in the syntactic layer that is processed by
machines and information in the semantic layer, which is used by
humans. Third, it recognizes the critical significance of the human
semantic layer or "cognitive dimension."
Any assessment of operations in cyberspace is incomplete
without including an examination of the role played by humans who
receive, evaluate, act upon, and transmit information as they work
with computer systems and networks-and thus make up a part of
cyberspace themselves. For this reason, a more accurate definition of
this metaphorical space may be "inside and by computer
networks." 243 As cyberspace policy is more carefully assessed by
government authorities, the term cyberspace may thus be described
as "the virtual environment of information and interactions between
people." 244
The human, semantic, or cognitive layer of cyberspace may
present a lucrative target for hostile cyber acts. While it may be more
difficult to corrupt or manipulate the information going to humans
than it is to corrupt or manipulate the information used to control or
instruct systems, 245 hostile cyber acts directed against the cognitive
layer of cyberspace can cause grievous damages. The spectrum of
such damage extends across the universe of activities, machines, and
systems that rely on human operators. As noted above, attacking an
enemy by making data inaccessible or by disrupting information
systems may achieve limited, temporary goals. However,
Security and Monitoring, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (HSPD23)
(2008) ("[T]he interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and
includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers in critical industries.").
242. See LIBICKI, supra note 110, at 8-9 (discussing how cyberspace can be
thought of as having "three layers").
243. See THOMAS RID & MARC HECKER, WAR 2.0: IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 57 (2009) (discussing the origins and early conceptions of the word
cyberspace).
244. THE WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND
RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 1 (2009).
245. See LIBICKI, supra note 110, at 23 ("[I]t is usually more difficult to corrupt
information going to humans ... than it is to corrupt information that help run
information systems.").
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manipulating or corrupting the content of critical information upon
which enemy leaders and human operators rely may yield more
serious, longer lasting damage.
The legal significance of using cyber capabilities to target the
semantic layer of cyberspace is profound. Such actions inject an
important, manipulated, human decision-making interruption into
what might incorrectly be viewed as a purely technological chain of
events flowing from a cyber act to its destructive consequences.
Without this human decision-making interruption, a planned hostile
cyber act may be unable to cause its intended damage. As discussed
below, some-type of interference in this cognitive step appears to be a
key feature in the most successful and complex emerging cyber
weapons.
The components and operation of the Stuxnet worm illustrate
how a modern cyber weapon can be designed for multiple purposes
(including the exploitation and manipulation of information) and how
it can be directed against different layers of cyberspace (including the
syntactic layer with its human decision-making processes). Rather
than the hypothetical scenario discussed above involving a cyber
attack based on a simplistic, direct, mechanical "cause-and-effect"
chain of events, the Stuxnet worm represents a very different reality.
Stuxnet reportedly penetrated computer systems at Natanz, a
highly secure Iranian nuclear facility, in an undetected and
clandestine manner and accessed information in the targeted systems
through unauthorized means. 246 Once inside, it recorded, stored, and
transmitted information about the operation of the targeted control
systems (an exploitation process directed at information going to both
machines and humans).247 It ultimately manipulated data going to
systems that controlled the facility's centrifuges to make them
operate improperly, with resulting damage (a hostile act of
information manipulation against the syntactic layer of
cyberspace). 248 Finally, it gave false data to the Iranian centrifuge
246. DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL 196 (2012) (describing how
engineers at Natanz unwittingly used infected thumb drives and laptops that
reportedly transmitted the worm into the computer system there); see also Nicole
Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Nations Buying as Hackers Sell Flaws in Computer Code,
N.Y. TIMEs (July 13, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/
worldleurope/nations-buying-as-hackers-sell-computer-flaws.html?pagewanted=all
(noting how Stuxnet took advantage of several valuable "zero days" vulnerabilities,
"including one in a [Microsoft] Windows font program" to enter the computer system at
an Iranian nuclear facility, access information, and plant codes).
247. See SANGER, supra note 246, at 196 (describing how Stuxnet reportedly first
planted "beacons" that in several months were able to "report home - complete with
maps of electronic directories of the controllers, and what amounted to blueprints of
how the centrifuges spinning in the basement in Natanz were connected to their
electronic control systems').
248. See id. at xi, xv (noting how Stuxnet was reportedly designed to "strike
directly" at the centrifuges and how intelligence sources suggested that "just shy of a
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operators indicating that the centrifuges were operating properly
when they were not (a key act of information manipulation against
the cognitive layer of cyberspace), thus allowing the damage to occur
and not be detected-and halted-by the operators. 249
A piece of computer code in the Stuxnet worm that had recorded
and secretly transmitted back to its masters routine operations in the
Natanz nuclear facility reportedly allowed the malware to later send
signals to the operators in the Natanz control room "indicating that
everything downstairs was operating normally."250 This deception of
the human Iranian operators regarding the status of malfunctioning
centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility thus played a central role in
causing the damage that was ultimately attributed to Stuxnet,
demonstrating a close connection between data exploitation and the
destruction caused by the manipulation of the data itself.251
The Stuxnet incident illustrates how one hostile cyber act may
actually involve an elaborate series of technical events and
programmed malware actions that ultimately depend on human
operators to make key, damaging decisions based on their assessment
of manipulated information. For purposes of applying the IHL
framework, this human decision-making step in cyber actions is
highly problematic. Hostile cyber acts that manipulate data in the
semantic layer (with highly damaging consequences) may simply be
new technologically enhanced versions of older and legally
permissible activities by states, particularly conventional acts of
deception and misinformation.
In terms of the IHL framework, elaborate and diverse efforts by
military forces to deceive adversaries are as old as warfare itself and
have long been recognized as legitimate conduct (unless constituting
acts of perfidy). For example, "[riuses or war" were explicitly
recognized as permissible under the Hague Regulations of 1907.252
Protocol I further provides that permissible ruses of war include "acts
intended to mislead an adversary to induce him to act recklessly" and
thousand centrifuges had come crashing to a halt inside the underground cavern at
Natanz").
249. See Jonathan V. Last, Bride of Stuxnet: Webcraft as Spycraft, 17 THE
WEEKLY STANDARD, no. 37, June 11, 2012, at 18-19, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/bride-stuxnet_646424.html?page=2 ("Once
Stuxnet reached its destination, it had very precise instructions: It altered the speed of
the centrifuges in such a manner as to slowly degrade the equipment and destroy the
uranium they contained-all while sending false readings back to the operating console
so that neither the computer nor the human supervisors would notice the damage
being done.").
250. SANGER, supra note 246, at 175.
251. See id. (quoting an unnamed U.S. official as saying that the ability of
Stuxnet to deceive Iranian operators regarding the ongoing malfunction of the
centrifuges "may have been the most brilliant part of the code").
252. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Annex (Regulations), supra note 120, at art. 24.
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"the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and
misinformation."253 Cyber capabilities will increase opportunities for
practicing ruses of war and other acts of deception, but since the
deception of humans with misinformation-however it is
introduced-is explicitly permitted by the IHL framework, it is
inappropriate to classify such cyber acts of deception as attacks and
acts of violence. 2 54
Attempts by states to use information to promote their views and
influence the actions of other states and those states' populations are
common and even a fundamental part of international relations. 25 5
The transmission of unwelcome information (by means of radio,
television, and the Internet) is not, however, the equivalent of an
armed attack for purposes of the jus ad bellum but again is more
likely to resemble other nonphysical techniques of coercion (such as
economic measures), which are more appropriately considered in the
context of illegal acts of intervention.256
Many common techniques practiced by states in the fields of
diplomacy, arms control, and security policy depend to a significant
degree on the use of misinformation and related measures to affect
the psychological disposition of their adversaries.257 Because of their
nature and regardless of their effects, such unfriendly psychological
and ideological actions standing alone cannot be viewed as illegal
253. See Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 37(2) (providing that "[riuses of war
are not prohibited" if they "infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed
conflict and ... are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an
adversary with respect to protection under that law").
254. See, e.g., Knut D6rmann, Computer Network Attack and International
Humanitarian Law, CAMBRIDGE R. INT'L AFF. 24 (May 19, 2001), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/5p2alj.htm (noting that
"[c]omputer data creates new opportunities for practising [sic] ruses of war" and that
"parties to a conflict will be tempted to plant misinformation deliberately with a view
to confuse the adversary. Such misinformation about one's own military plans is
perfectly lawful and is no different in principle to any other vehicle for
misinformation.").
255. LEIGH ARMISTEAD, INFORMATION OPERATIONS: WARFARE AND THE HARD
REALITY OF SOFT POWER 9 (2004) (arguing that "information, as an element of power, is
the most fungible and useful force at all political levels, including the systemic
structure of international relations in the post-Cold War era").
256. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 25/2625 (XXV), Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/25/2625, at 123 (Oct. 24, 1970) ("No State or group of States has the right to
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.").
257. See generally ROBERT JERVIS, RICHARD NED LEBOW & JANICE GROSS STEIN,
PSYCHOLOGY AND DETERRENCE (1989) (discussing the underlying assumptions that
often form the foundation for deterrence strategy).
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uses of force under international law, even from a consequentialist
perspective. 258
U.S. Military manuals describing modern "information
operations" further illustrate critical similarities (and overlaps)
between many long-practiced, conventional misinformation practices
and hostile cyber acts that target information going to humans. 259
The similarities are especially strong when comparing conventional
military operations intended to "influence" decision makers (by
inducing them to accept misinformation as truth or otherwise rely
upon the content of incorrect information) with cyber acts that are
intended to influence decision makers by making them rely on
corrupted or manipulated data.
Cyber actions that target information used by humans and
conventional information operations both involve the application of
different forms of information on human decision makers as
targets. 260 In this regard, U.S. national military strategy explicitly
acknowledges that cyberspace provides a "link into the cognitive
dimension."261
Computer network, psychological, and deception operations are
all viewed by the U.S. military as tools that can be used in
combination to "influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp [adversarial
human and automated decision making] while protecting our own."262
Thus, through both cyber and conventional methods, information
operations can take "specific psychological, electronic, or physical
actions that add, modify, or remove information from the
environment of various individuals or groups of decision makers."263
The combination of human and mechanical targets and the
integrated employment of human and technological capabilities blur
meaningful legal distinctions between many cyber and conventional
information operations. These operations may share the same
objectives and employ similar methods to manipulate or corrupt data
258. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 44, at 577 ("[It is well accepted that the
international law governing the use of force does not prohibit propaganda,
psychological warfare, or espionage. To the extent such activities are conducted
through cyber operations, they are presumptively legitimate.").
259. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, INFORMATION OPERATIONS AIR
FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 3-13, at vii (amended July. 18, 2011) ("The three IO
capabilities-influence operations, electronic warfare operations, and network warfare
operations-while separate and distinct, when linked, can achieve operationally
important IO effects.").
260. See, e,g., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. & JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INFORMATION
OPERATIONS JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13, at 1-3 to 1-9, 11-9 to II-11 (2012) [hereinafter
JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13] (referring to "target audiences" as an "individual or group
selected for influence").
261. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. & CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 5 (2006).
262. JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13, supra note 260, at GL-3.
263. Id. at 1-6 to 1-8.
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used by an adversary's human decision makers, often with damaging
consequences for that adversary.
In this context, cyber methodologies that significantly depend on
the deception of human decision makers must be carefully and
cautiously assessed. To suggest that consequences alone determine
the legal status of a hostile cyber act under the IHL regime when the
act itself is intertwined with, and fundamentally dependent on, the
use of misinformation to deceive humans represents a potentially
radical revision of the IHL regime. It risks a dangerous expansion of
the regime beyond recognized acts of violence to encompass many
conventional information operations as well as other common state
activities that have political, diplomatic, or psychological objectives
(and which have long been explicitly regarded as legally permissible).
Notwithstanding these concerns as they might pertain to the
targeted human operators at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran,
some writers view the physical damage associated with the Stuxnet
incident as meeting the threshold for attacks under the IHL
framework, based solely on the resulting physical damages. 264
However, state practice cannot be invoked to support such a position,
in part because the details of Stuxnet's development and deployment
remain shrouded in secrecy. Nonetheless, the fact remains that states
have been reluctant to treat the Stuxnet incident as anything other
than a sophisticated act of sabotage-just as Iran complained that
Stuxnet had made it "the target of sabotage" (and reportedly
responded to Stuxnet by taking its own harmful, covert actions
against American and Western interests). 265 The question thus
remains whether current state practice will change or whether
complex malware packages dependent on human deception and
involving a chain of mechanical events interrupted by human decision
making are to be routinely evaluated by states based solely on their
effects without also focusing on the nature of the underlying
informational act.266
264. See, e.g., Michael Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, 17 J. CONFLICT
& SEC. L. 245, 251-52 (noting that "if a State was behind the 2010 'Stuxnet'
attack ... it would meet this threshold [attacks satisfying the armed criterion of armed
conflict] because physical damage resulted").
265. See Thomas Erdbrink, Ahmadinejad: Iran's Nuclear Program Hit by
Sabotage, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2010, 2:23 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/29/AR2010112903468.html (reporting on Ahmadinejad's
response tb suspected cyber actions against Iranian centrifuges); Thomas Joscelyn,
Stuxnet and Iran's Shadow War, THE WEEKLEY STANDARD (June 8, 2012, 8:08 AM),
http://www.weeklystandard.comlblogs/stuxnet-and-iran-s-shadow-war_646788.html
(noting that Iran responded to Stuxnet through various hostile covert actions,
including the attempted assassination of American and other foreign diplomats).
266. Human involvement may also make the already tenuous and complex link
between the origins and results of cyber actions even more difficult to discern. See RID,
supra note 124, at 3 (2012) (noting that "[iun an act of cyber war, the actual use of force
is likely to be a far more complex and mediated sequence of causes and consequences
that ultimately result in violence and casualties" and that in some scenarios "the
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Along similar lines, an extension of the jus ad bellum to cyber
actions that are dependent on the dissemination of misinformation to
humans would risk dramatically expanding the scope and nature of
that regime, potentially extending it to encompass many areas of
common state practice in diverse fields. Hostile cyber acts
manipulating data used by humans may in fact be difficult to
distinguish from many conventional and lawful information
operations, making these acts highly problematic substitutes for
armed attacks under the UN Charter.
V. CONCLUSION
The unfriendly use of information by states, particularly in
wartime, is as old as states themselves.267 Modern variants, in the
form of unfriendly cyber acts, are now an unwelcome but common
feature of international relations. While it has long been apparent
that hostile cyber acts are capable of causing great damage, to this
point in history, damages alone have not been determinative of the
legal status of these acts. From the physical destruction apparently
caused by a logic bomb in the control system of a Siberian pipeline in
the 1980s, to the widespread disruption of computer systems in
Estonia in 2007, to damaged centrifuges in an Iranian nuclear facility
in 2011, states have shown a consistent unwillingness to impose the
armed conflict legal model or the jus ad bellum on hostile cyber acts
standing alone.
This legally significant, widespread, and consistent state practice
rejecting the cyber war model (by not actually applying IHL rules or
the jus ad bellum to cyber acts by themselves) stands in stark
contrast to much popular wisdom and the approaches of many
commentators. 268 In part, this state practice reflects the political and
strategic reality that hostile cyber acts are by themselves not well
suited for use as instruments of armed conflict or typical armed
attacks. 269 They are instead better described as "merely sophisticated
causal chain that links somebody pushing a button to somebody else being hurt is
mediated, delayed, and permeated by chance and friction").
267. See generally PHILIP M. TAYLOR, MUNITIONS OF THE MIND: WAR
PROPAGANDA FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE NUCLEAR AGE (1990).
268. See, e.g., Cyber-Warfare: Hype and Fear, supra note 229 (noting that
"[p]olitical and military leaders miss no chance to declare that cyberwar is already
upon us").
269. Thomas Rid commented that
[t]o count as an armed attack, a computer breach would need to be violent. If it
can't hurt or kill, it can't be war. An act of cyberwar would also need to be
instrumental. In a military confrontation, one party generally uses force to
compel the other party to do something they would otherwise not do. Finally, it
would need to be political, in the sense that one opponent says, 'If you don't do
X, we'll strike you .... No past cyberattack meets these criteria.
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versions of three activities that are as old as warfare itself:
subversion, espionage, and sabotage." 270 As hostile cyber acts remain
by themselves unlikely instruments of war and are relegated to other
categories of unfriendly state behavior that do not involve the use of
armed force, they have justifiably also remained outside the scope of
the IHL framework and the jus ad bellum.
While the debate about the applicability of international legal
models to hostile cyber acts continues, incidents of domestic and
transnational cybercrime continue to multiply as national legal
systems attempt to respond to this clearly growing threat. For this
reason, it has been suggested that the crime or law enforcement
model can be described as the best "default" position for considering
unfriendly acts in cyberspace. 271
As discussed above, the growing threat posed by cybercrime has
been accompanied by an increasing willingness on the part of some
states to sponsor or engage in various acts of cyber espionage,
sabotage, and subversion (which in many cases may be
indistinguishable from acts of cybercrime). Yet to this point, states
have clearly resisted treating such hostile cyber acts as constituting
"cyberwar" and have not invoked the IHL framework and the jus ad
bellum as the appropriate legal models to actually govern any of them
standing alone. At the same time, it is also clear that great risks
accompany any effort to expand the IHL framework to include all
manner of unfriendly state actions, thereby undermining both the jus
in bello and the international legal prohibition on the use of force.
Hostile cyber acts clearly pose a threat to modern societies,
particularly as the damaging effects of those acts have the potential
to cascade through governments, military forces, industries, and
national infrastructures that are becoming increasingly
interconnected and fundamentally dependent on computer systems
and networks. 272 Legal assessments of these events based on
See Thomas Rid, End This Phony Cyberwar, 219 NEW SCIENTIST, no. 2933, Sept. 7,
2013, at 26, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/health-and-science/new
scientist/2013/09/cyberwar.and-cyberattacks it_s-really-espionage-subversion or..sab
otage.html.
270. See Rid, supra note 12, at 6 (questioning whether the "Cassandras of cyber
warfare [are] on the right side of history" and noting that "[clyber war has never
happened in the past. Cyber war does not take place in the present. And it is highly
unlikely that cyber war will occur in the future.").
271. See Dunlap, supra note 109, at 84 ("All things being equal, cyber strategists
should default to the law enforcement modality. This makes practical sense, because
many experts see cyber crime (as opposed to cyberwar) as the most serious and most
common threat in the cyber domain. 'Crime,' incidentally, could include acts at the
behest of a nation-state, such as cyber espionage targeting a government or industry.").
272. See Little, supra note 165, at 111 (discussing the interdependent nature of
modern national infrastructures and how this interdependency problem is "further
compounded by the extensive linkage of physical infrastructure with information
technology systems. Communication and information technologies ... are already
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damages alone, however, neglect the importance of the underlying
acts and the problems posed by information itself. Fundamental legal
concepts in physical domains are linked to the physical properties of
physical forces and objects, giving concepts and phrases like
"territory," "attribution," "invasion," "armed force," and "acts of
violence" their full meaning.
While establishing the origins of actions and finding direct
connections between causes and effects in physical domains is not
always easy, these issues are nonetheless explained by physical
phenomena and are subject to physical rules governing space,
physics, chemistry, and so forth. The domain of information, however,
is fundamentally different. It consists of different layers and
dimensions, as well as infinite actors and constructs. It is a domain in
which identities, human cognitive functions, data, and mechanical
processes may be blurred. Content problems impede meaningful
classification of many cyber acts, while the pervasive problem of data
exploitation further complicates attempts to establish legal
thresholds, distinguish,cyber acts, and define damages. For these and
the other reasons set forth in this Article, the IHL regime and the jus
ad bellum will generally not be applied to cyber events standing alone
and states will continue to be reluctant to transfer the application of
these frameworks from the physical to the informational.
It is not difficult to find serious, inherent challenges confronting
other attempts to regulate information as a conventional weapon that
reflect the four key problem areas examined in this Article. In
particular, attempts to regulate information as a weapon in arms
control regimes offer further compelling evidence of the fundamental,
vexing, and legally significant differences between the physical and
the informational.
Although a detailed examination of arms control regimes lies
beyond the scope of this Article, it is clear that information makes
conventional versions of such regimes highly problematic vehicles for
regulating cyber weapons and conflicts in cyberspace. The origin and
attribution problems of information that challenge other legal
frameworks wreak havoc in arms control regimes, undermining not
only monitoring and verification processes but also complementary
theories of deterrence. 273 While the anonymity of information and
affecting infrastructure system design, construction, maintenance, operations, and
control, and more change appears inevitable.").
273. See Lynn, supra note 17, at 100 ('Traditional arms control regimes would
likely fail to deter cyberattacks because of the challenges of attribution, which make
verification of compliance almost impossible."); John B. Sheldon, The Case Against
Cyber Arms Control, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7273/the-case-against-cyber-arms-control
("Yet just as the problem of attribution makes it difficult to identify culprit and motive,
so the anonymity of cyberspace means that any cyber arms limitation treaty will lack
the crucial 'trust but verify' component.").
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cyber actions presents severe challenges to many forms of legal
regulation, it is a particularly destabilizing factor for arms control
regimes (that depend on verification of the performance of
commitments) or for any other regimes in which the participants
hope to "instill and enforce behavioral norms."274
The unlimited availability of information and the ubiquity of
information-related technologies present further foundational
challenges to arms control regimes. Any attempt to define the subject
matter of a cyber arms control regime must first deal with the reality
that individual computers cannot "reasonably be treated as analogous
to conventional weapons."2 75 The availability of harmful information
also means that a vast number of actors are potentially implicated in
any effort to create a cyber arms control regime, in contrast to the
small number of actors playing key roles in the most significant arms
control agreements to date-particularly those involving nuclear
weapons and other arms control initiatives during the Cold War. 276
The widely dispersed availability of information resources will
also force any group of states attempting to fashion an arms control
regime to deal with another reality of information weapons: that in
contrast to other military technologies such as nuclear weapons, "the
private sector has essentially unlimited access to most of the
technology that underlies cyberattack weapons."2 77 This means that
not only is the scope of the destructive uses of these weapons spread
over a much wider range but also that "an extraordinary degree of
intrusiveness would be required to impose controls on the private
acquisition and use of cyber weapons." 27 8
The designers of computer programs with possible military
applications, in both the government and private sectors, must also
deal with the uniquely replicable nature of information and cyber
weapons. This means that subjecting such computer programs to
inspection may result in the immediate loss of those information
274. See Appendix A to CYBERATTACK WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 76,
at 345, 362 (noting how "the inherent anonymity of cyberattacks" makes it "difficult to
hold violators of any agreement accountable" and that "behavioral norms are generally
much harder to instill and enforce in an environment in which actors can act
anonymously").
275. Abraham D. Sofaer, David Clark & Whitfield Diffie, Cyber Security and
International Agreements, in CYBERATTACK WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS, supra note 76, at
179, 192.
276. See Patrick M. Morgan, Applicability of Traditional Deterrence Concepts
and Theory to the Cyber Realm, in CYBERATTACK WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS, supra note
76, at 74 (noting that "while Cold War arms control sometimes involved numerous
actors, fundamentally it was the work of a small number .... [A]nd some important
steps could be taken unilaterally. Sustaining and stabilizing security in cyberspace will
likely involve a great many more actors.").
277. Appendix A, supra note 274, at 361.
278. Id.
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packages to adversaries and the proliferation of the weapon that is
the focus of regulation.
Looming over all attempts at cyber arms control, even those
involving limited attempts to restrict attacks to protect certain
components of a nation's critical national infrastructure, are the
intractable problems associated with distinguishing various types of
unauthorized access to information. As discussed above, achieving a
meaningful degree of legal precision in defining and distinguishing
different types of hostile cyber acts may be extraordinarily difficult,
and placing limitations on one type of action may be impossible to
separate from restrictions on other actions widely accepted as
lawful. 279 Yet it seems unavoidable that proposed agreements
limiting acts of cyber war would nonetheless be required to
distinguish hostile cyber acts that merely constitute unauthorized
access to systems, temporary disruptions in those systems, and
exploitation of resident information from other prohibited acts of data
manipulation and destruction.
Finally, attempts to create cyber arms control agreements or
precursor "codes of conduct" continue to confront a central challenge
posed by information: its content. For example, beginning in 1998,
Russia launched a cyber arms control initiative at the UN General
Assembly (fashioned as an "International Code of Conduct") with a
troublesome content-related focus, containing prohibitions on
"information terrorism" as well as new "information security"
concepts that essentially gave unwelcome words the status of
weapons. 280
Russian cyber arms control and information security proposals
continue to focus on a state's territorial sovereignty and control over
its own information resources and space, asserting that "policy
authority for Internet-related public issues is the sovereign right of
States." 281 These proposals further highlight the difficulties in
defining what constitutes "harmful information." They also leave the
279. See id. (noting that "from the target's perspective, it may be difficult or
impossible to distinguish between a cyber operation intended for attack and one
intended for exploitation. Restrictions on cyberattack will almost certainly restrict
cyber exploitation to a large degree, and nations-including the United States-may
well be loath to surrender even in principle any such capability for gaining
intelligence.").
280. See Tom Gjelten, Shadow Wars: Debating Cyber 'Disarmament,' 173 WORLD
AFF., no. 4, (2010), at 33-34, available at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/
article/shadow-wars-debating-cyber-disarmament (noting that these efforts are not
unlike earlier efforts by Soviet diplomats to criminalize what they referred to as
"ideological aggression").
281. See Permanent Rep. of China, Permanent Rep. of the Russian Federation,
Permanent Rep. of Tajikistan, Permanent Rep. of Uzbekistan, Annex to the Letter
dated Sept. 12, 2011 from the Permanent Reps. of China, the Russian Federation,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,
at 3, U.N. Doc. A166/359 (Sept. 14, 2011).
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status of many information activities, such as social networking
through Facebook and Twitter, uncertain, based on the stated need to
"prevent the potential use of information and communication
technologies for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of
maintaining international stability and security and may adversely
affect the integrity of the infrastructure within States."2 8 2
It is thus not surprising that efforts to regulate the content of
information under the guise of cyber arms control have highlighted
how "[pirofound differences exist among potential member states to a
cyber security agreement on the privacy and human rights to be
accorded users." 283 Such efforts also focus attention on inherent
conflicts between state sovereignty, censorship, and the freedom of
the Internet. 284
Dangers and dilemmas clearly confront efforts to broadly impose
legal regimes on information in the same manner as they apply to
physical weapons and targets in the physical world, even if
destructive physical consequences are involved. In spite of this, it is
suggested or simply assumed that international law-particularly the
IHL framework-should be used to fill perceived legal gaps in
cyberspace as states compete and clash in that realm, just as those
rules govern conduct in the physical world. 285 This approach
corresponds with the view that conflict in cyberspace generally
implicates international legal issues, rather than political, policy, or
technology issues that are outside the realm of laws governing armed
conflict and the use of armed force.
In an effort to affirm that law and order has been successfully
imposed on cyberspace, the U.S. government has declared that "the
digital world is no longer a lawless frontier." 286 However true this
282. See id. at 3-4 (pledging participating states "to cooperate in combating
criminal and terrorist activities that use information and communications technologies,
including networks, and in curbing the dissemination of information that incites
terrorism, secessionism or extremism or that undermines other countries' political,
economic and social stability, as well as their spiritual and cultural environment").
283. See Sofaer, supra note 275, at 194-95 (noting that "[t]he U.S. and other
democratic societies are justifiably concerned that cyber system regulation-and
indeed some measures that strengthen cyber security-may also result in reducing the
privacy and human rights of users").
284. See John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, U.S. and Russia Differ on a Treaty
for Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/06/28/world/28cyber.html?pagewanted=all ("Any agreement on cyberspace
presents special difficulties because the matter touches on issues like censorship of the
Internet, sovereignty and rogue actors who might not be subject to a treaty.").
285. See DOD CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that "[a]s
with all of the activities that DoD pursues in the physical world, cyberspace operations
are ... governed by all applicable domestic and international legal frameworks,
including . . . the law of armed conflict").
286. See Barack Obama, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
CYBERSPACE, supra note 48 ("The digital world is no longer a lawless frontier, nor the
province of a small elite. It is a place where the norms of responsible, just and peaceful
conduct among states and people have begun to take hold.").
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statement may be regarding the reach of domestic law into
cyberspace, international legal phantoms continue to abound there
and must be recognized for what they are: challenging informational
issues that are connected, in complex ways, to the physical world but
that should generally continue to lie outside the scope of the IHL
regime and the jus ad bellum.
